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Summary 
 
The European enforcement landscape is undergoing significant changes that are leading to a 
departure from the actors, tools and processes traditionally associated with delivering justice. 
This thesis examines these themes while developing a solution to the private enforcement gap 
that continues to leave a large number of victims without a remedy, particularly if they have 
suffered low-value individual harm as a result of competition infringements. In order to 
ensure that the private enforcement of EU competition law leads to the effective enforcement 
of EU rights and to the full compensation of all victims, a collective redress device must be 
developed. In particular, this thesis will explore whether optimal private enforcement 
outcomes could be achieved through the integration of collective alternative dispute 
resolution (‘collective ADR’) into a regulatory enforcement architecture as a first choice 
redress avenue. To date, the use of collective ADR as a private enforcement mechanism has 
not been considered as a serious policy option on the European level. While this thesis 
focuses on the use of collective ADR in the context of competition enforcement, it also 
confronts issues that could be expanded to private enforcement in other fields. Ultimately, the 
enforcement toolbox should be diversified not only to ensure the successful fulfilment of the 
regulatory goals, but also to facilitate the transformations that are occurring in the 
enforcement landscape more broadly. 
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Introduction	
 
The European enforcement landscape is undergoing significant changes that are leading to a 
departure from the actors, tools and processes traditionally associated with delivering justice. 
These changes include the increasing collectivisation and privatisation of enforcement, as 
well as the abandonment of the binary distinction between public and private enforcement.1 
Against this background, it is unfortunate that the development of a European collective 
redress device has not yet culminated with a legislative instrument, leaving many victims 
without an adequate remedy.2 In particular, there is an identifiable enforcement gap for large-
scale low-value damage resulting from competition infringements, which is predominantly 
suffered by consumers. In order to ensure that the private enforcement of EU competition law 
leads to the effective enforcement of EU rights and to the full compensation of all victims, a 
collective redress device must be provided. Ultimately, the enforcement toolbox should be 
diversified not only to ensure the successful fulfilment of the regulatory goals, but also to 
facilitate the transformations that are occurring in the enforcement landscape more broadly. 
 
This thesis examines whether it would be possible to achieve private enforcement outcomes 
for large groups of victims that are currently without a remedy in the most optimal manner 
with the consent of all parties involved. It is submitted that such outcomes can be achieved 
through the integration of collective alternative dispute resolution (‘collective ADR’) into a 
regulatory enforcement architecture as a first choice redress avenue. To date, the use of 
collective ADR as a private enforcement mechanism has not been considered as a serious 
policy option on the European level. The thesis explores the collective ADR proposal in the 
context of competition enforcement, however, it also confronts issues that could be expanded 
to private enforcement in other fields.  
 
This thesis is structured as follows. The first chapter sets the scene by defining collective 
ADR, its relationship with collective litigation, the policy developments on the EU level 
                                                            
1 H.-W. Micklitz & A. Wechsler (eds), The Transformation of Enforcement: European Economic Law in Global 
Perspective (Hart Publishing 2016). 
2 A decade of policy developments culminated with a non-binding instrument; Commission Recommendation of 
11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the 
Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law, OJ L 201. A collective redress device 
was also notably absent from the competition damages directive; Directive 2014/104/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under 
national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union, OJ L 349. 
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regarding collective redress and private enforcement, and the presence of collective ADR in 
existing legislation, particularly in the Damages Directive. The second and third chapter will 
start to construct the regulatory enforcement architecture that would be necessary for the 
successful integration of collective ADR. In particular, the second chapter inspects the 
incentives that would have to be created for the infringing undertakings, victims and their 
representatives in order to consensually initiate collective ADR, after which the third chapter 
considers the safeguards that would have to be created in order to ensure fairness guarantees. 
After outlining the theoretical framework, the fourth chapter presents a comparative analysis 
of two collective ADR models in the national enforcement architectures of the UK and the 
Netherlands in order to illustrate how collective ADR works in practice and to draw lessons 
for the development of a European model. The fifth chapter reflects on the proposal more 
broadly, particularly on its ability to meet the goals of private enforcement and its 
transformative implications for the European Commission’s current practice. The thesis 
concludes with preliminary policy recommendations for the development of a collective ADR 
model.  
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Chapter 1: Setting the scene 
 
1.1 What is collective ADR?  
 
Collective ADR is an umbrella term that will be used to describe voluntary alternative-to-
court dispute resolution processes that can be used in collective harm cases in order to reach a 
consensual outcome. Foremost, collective ADR is a voluntary and consensual process. The 
expression of consent can occur at different stages – for instance, the initiation of ADR is 
generally voluntary for all parties involved, however, if national civil justice systems made 
ADR a mandatory step in civil proceedings, then compliance with the ADR outcome would 
nevertheless be voluntary. Furthermore, ADR processes are generally confidential, subject to 
some legal and practical limitations, particularly in case a large number of parties are 
involved. The collective dimension would start from two or more victims and include both 
legal and natural persons. Moreover, ADR processes could function with an intermediary 
public or private entity, or without the involvement of any third parties. Third party 
involvement could take several forms, ranging from simply facilitating negotiations to issuing 
a binding decision. If the ADR process is successful, then it could lead to a binding or non-
binding outcome. A binding agreement could take the form of a settlement, whereas a binding 
decision could be any arrangement that was accepted by the parties prior to the initiation of a 
third party procedure (e.g. arbitration, which leads to an arbitral award). Finally, in contrast 
with court judgments, there is generally more flexibility as to the substantive content of the 
ADR outcomes. 
The current landscape of ADR mechanisms and entities in the Member States is highly 
multifaceted and new forms of offline and online dispute resolution are in continuous 
development. It is therefore important not to exclude any innovative forms of ADR through 
the use of rigid definitions. In order to give a systematic account of the different forms of 
collective ADR that exist, the following categorization could be developed. The categories are 
presented in a hierarchical order according to the level of formalism and bindingness that they 
feature: 
Collective negotiation without an ADR entity - The most informal type of collective ADR is 
direct negotiation aimed at reaching a consensual agreement in the form of a settlement. 
Direct negotiations are generally conducted without the use of ADR entities and rely on the 
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legal representatives of the parties. The direct negotiation category could also include various 
internal complaint mechanisms, which the undertaking has developed. 
 
Collective negotiation through an ADR entity - The key examples of negotiation-based forms 
of ADR are mediation and conciliation, in which a third party actively assists the parties in 
coming to a consensual agreement, but does not issue a binding decision. With conciliation, 
the third party also makes a suggestion for terms of the settlement or issues a non-binding 
opinion. 
 
Collective adjudication through an ADR entity - ADR entities other than arbitral tribunals can 
offer adjudicative procedures, in which a third party issues a decision, which is binding 
through contracts. However, such decisions will generally provide less certainty in terms of 
recognition and enforcement. Moreover, ADR entities across the EU have limited experience 
with mass claims.3 
 
Collective Ombudsman procedures through an ADR entity - A public or private Ombudsman 
is an independent third party, who can employ various ADR mechanisms, including 
adjudicative procedures or mediation, which result in a binding or non-binding decision. 
Ombudsmen are often created as sector-specific ADR entities. As there are many procedural 
variations in existence, the definition of Ombudsman is far from harmonized. 
 
Collective arbitration through an arbitration tribunal - The most court-like type of collective 
ADR is arbitration, in which an adjudicating third party issues a decision - the arbitral award - 
that is binding on the basis of contract law and international agreements. Due to its formal 
adjudicative nature, combined with strong recognition and enforcement effects, arbitration is 
sometimes distinguished from other forms of ADR. Moreover, unlike other ADR entities, 
arbitration tribunals do have considerable experience with managing mass claims, which are 
often referred to as multi-party or class arbitration, depending on their opt-in or opt-out 
nature.  
 
                                                            
3 For a comparative study on consumer ADR entities and mass torts, see C. Hodges & A. Stadler (eds), 
Resolving Mass Disputes: ADR and Settlement of Mass Claims (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013). 
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Having obtained a basic overview of ADR mechanisms and entities, the next preliminary 
point regards the context in which collective ADR will be placed in this thesis - the private 
enforcement of EU competition law. 
 
1.2 Why competition law? 
 
To begin with, the EU enjoys a high level of competence in competition matters, which has 
allowed for the harmonization of substantive competition law. As demonstrated by the rapid 
development of private enforcement on the EU level, substantive harmonization has made the 
harmonization of procedural rules significantly easier to justify.4 A significant step towards 
harmonizing competition-specific tort rules has already been taken with the adoption of the 
Damages Directive. 5  However, despite these developments, the current framework is 
inadequate for the weakest victims of competition infringements.  
 
In particular, collective proceedings are still missing from the private enforcement toolbox 
and additional measures must be envisioned in order to ensure the ‘effective enforcement of 
EU rights’ and ‘full compensation’ for all victims. The presence of an identifiable 
enforcement gap for large-scale low-value damage sets EU competition law apart from many 
other fields. Currently, private enforcement claims are only being brought by a specific group 
of undertakings: competitors and direct purchasers. According to research conducted in the 
UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, barely any cases have been brought by indirect 
purchasers and none by umbrella purchasers.6 One of the primary reasons for this dynamic is 
the fact that competitors and direct purchasers generally have the sufficient resources to bring 
actions and due to their close connection to the infringement, their claims are substantively 
and procedurally easier to establish. It is submitted that this enforcement gap could be closed 
by introducing a collective redress device. 
 
Moreover, both anecdotal and empirical evidence would suggest that a large share of EU 
competition law disputes never reach courts because they are settled. 7  For instance, 
                                                            
4  M. Ioannidou, Consumer Involvement in Private EU Competition Law Enforcement (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2015), p. 189. 
5 Damages Directive (n 2). 
6 I. Lianos, P. Davis & P. Nebbia, Damages Claims for the Infringement of EU Competition Law (Oxford 
University Press 2015), p. 73. 
7 D. Waelbroeck, D. Slater & G. Even-Shoshan, ‘Ashurst Study on the Conditions of Claims for Damages in 
Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules’, Brussels, 31 August, 2004, p. 134; for a UK study, see B. 
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settlements could be preferred in order to reduce costs and inconvenience, as well as to 
maintain existing relationships and safeguard one’s reputation. If the out-of-court settlement 
of claims is already the hidden reality of private enforcement, then targeted regulation could 
be envisioned, for instance in order to ensure fairness guarantees for the weaker parties. 
 
Finally, the existence of powerful public enforcers distinguishes competition law from many 
other fields. For instance, victims that suffer large-scale low-value damages are generally 
consumers and they could equally benefit from collective devices in other consumer-oriented 
fields. However, the existence of a competition-specific public enforcer enables the creation 
of additional incentives for the initiation of collective ADR. This interplay between public and 
private enforcement turns competition law into a valuable testing ground for collective ADR. 
 
1.3 A toolbox of collective redress 
 
Before starting the exploration of collective ADR as a tool of private enforcement, some basic 
considerations must be provided in favour of collective proceedings. In essence, the lower 
transaction costs of aggregated proceedings make them a necessary tool for the achievement 
of efficient private enforcement outcomes in large-scale low-value damage scenarios. The 
economic advantages of collective proceedings over individual proceedings are obvious in 
relation to the lower individual costs borne by the victims. Savings can also be envisioned for 
the defendants, who would not have to engage on several fronts and could benefit from the 
certainty of once-and-for-all outcomes. Aggregation is also capable of lowering the broader 
public costs resulting from the administration of justice. This would arguably not be the case 
if collective proceedings lead to the introduction of claims which would otherwise not have 
been brought at all. Yet, the multifaceted societal benefits resulting from the increased access 
to justice and deterrence of wrongdoing could counterbalance the costs associated with the 
additional claims arising from gap-filling areas.  
 
Two categories of collective proceedings could be considered in order to reap the 
aforementioned benefits: collective litigation and collective ADR. The former is a formal 
process that requires initiation on behalf of the victims, whereas the latter is an informal, 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Rodger, ‘The Consumer Rights Act 2015 and Collective Redress for Competition Law Infringements in the UK: 
a Class Act?’ (2015) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Vol. 3(2), 258, and B. Rodger, ‘Private Rnforcement of 
Competition Law, the Hidden Story: Competition Litigation Settlements in the United Kingdom, 2000-2005’ 
(2008) European Competition Law Review Vol. 29(2), 96. 
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consensual process that requires interest from both sides. Both collective ADR and collective 
redress litigation can take very different procedural forms, but the key characteristics of both 
mechanisms are suitable for a comparative analysis. The pros and cons of both mechanisms 
can be compared in the abstract, but for the purposes of this thesis, it is more important to 
compare them in relation to achieving particular goals. In other words, the question pursued is 
not whether we should choose between ADR and litigation, but rather, what should be their 
relationship in different enforcement contexts. Ultimately, the success of collective private 
enforcement depends on its effectiveness in delivering compensation and creating deterrence, 
not on its particular mode of execution. It is proposed that any mechanism that is capable of 
fulfilling these objectives should be given consideration. 
 
Collective ADR and collective litigation share several structural characteristics that are 
common to all collective proceedings. In particular, the effectiveness of collective 
proceedings is largely based on whether the grouping of victims occurs on an opt-in or opt-
out basis. The use of an opt-out model, whereby non-participating victims would be bound 
without their explicit consent, raises important access to justice concerns, which must be 
addressed. Moreover, all collective proceedings require some form of representation on behalf 
of the victims, which raises principal-agent concerns. The representatives would also require 
some funding in order to start the proceedings. While the costs of litigation can undoubtedly 
be substantial, even the most informal negotiation-based forms of ADR are not costless. 
Finally, in order to achieve sufficient finality, the international recognition and enforcement of 
the collective outcome would have to be ensured. Although the shared characteristics of 
collective proceedings raise common themes, differences will emerge in the way these 
concerns are to be mitigated. 
 
When comparing the two mechanisms, a general point of consensus is that the procedural 
efficiencies derived from the speed, lower costs and flexibility of ADR would be unmatched 
by litigation in most civil justice systems. Arbitration can be considered an exception in some 
cases, since it has become more expensive in recent years. Although the resolution of mass 
disputes would never be particularly fast, cheap or result in simple outcomes, it is likely that 
collective ADR is able to outperform collective redress litigation due to the consent and 
voluntary cooperation of the infringer. This points to the elephant in the room - the voluntary 
nature of collective ADR. In other words, it is only capable of delivering redress if also the 
infringing undertaking consents to it. This warrants the development of a regulatory 
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enforcement architecture, which creates incentives to induce the consent of the infringer. The 
construction of this architecture will be one of the key objectives of the thesis. 
 
There are additional ways in which collective ADR could work to the advantage of both the 
infringers and victims better than collective litigation. Firstly, a negotiated outcome would 
offer the certainty of obtaining actual compensation, which might not be the case with 
litigation in case the infringer were to become insolvent as a result of lengthy litigation 
proceedings. 8  Secondly, a ‘compromise’ in the context of collective ADR would not 
necessarily represent a relinquishment of legitimate claims on both sides of the dispute, if one 
considers that the value that the parties place on the particular aspects of the claim can be 
different.9 Through negotiation, the parties would receive the opportunity for a smarter trade-
off that represents their real needs and interests. These ‘more precisely just’ trade-offs can 
lead to unique remedial outcomes that would not be possible in courts.10 Thirdly, access to 
evidence could be hindered by the uncooperativeness of the infringing undertakings in a 
litigation setting. In a confidential ADR setting, they might be more likely to disclose certain 
documents. Fourthly, collective ADR could also help overcome procedural obstacles that are 
especially prevalent with competition law infringements. For example, there are potential 
conflicts between victims that are direct and indirect purchasers, since the harm they suffered 
is intertwined. When determining a common ‘class’ in collective litigation, some national 
systems could prevent them from joining their efforts due to the lack of a common interest or 
benefit.11 As long as the passing-on defence exists, conflicts between victims are capable of 
undermining collective redress litigation.12 Collective ADR would be more flexible and allow 
the parties to decide the scope of the coverage themselves. Another example regards the 
serious difficulties with the quantification of harm due to the methodology and resources that 
would have to be spent on obtaining the relevant data and expertise. For certain victims, it 
would be impossible to gather the information required to make an accurate assessment of 
specific and individual harm for the purposes of litigation.13 Again, the flexibility of collective 
ADR would allow for custom approaches and approximations of harm. 
 
                                                            
8 H. Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford University Press 2002), p. 332. 
9 C. Menkel-Meadow, ‘Whose Dispute Is it Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement 
(In Some Cases)’ (1995) Georgia Law Review Vol. 83, 2663, p. 2673. 
10 Menkel-Meadow 1995 (n 9), p. 2674-2675. 
11 This scenario occurred in Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways Plc [2009] EWHC 741 Ch, [2010] CH 48. 
12 L. Athanassiou, ‘Collective Redress and Competition Policy’ in A. Nuyts & N.E. Hatzimihail (eds), Cross-
Border Class Actions: The European Way (Sellier European Law Publishers 2014), p. 153. 
13 Athanassiou 2014 (n 12), p. 156. 
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Ultimately, if it is possible to achieve private enforcement outcomes for victims that would 
otherwise not receive redress, all the while doing this in the most optimal manner with the 
consent of all parties involved, then why would we not explore this further? 
 
1.4 EU policy developments 
 
Regrettably, collective ADR has not yet been served as a serious policy option for the private 
enforcement of competition law nor within the broader collective redress debate. As a result, 
there is a scarcity of literature assessing collective ADR and its interactions with the existing 
redress and enforcement frameworks, especially with regards to EU competition law. In order 
to place the forthcoming analysis of collective ADR into context, a brief overview of recent 
EU-level developments on collective redress and private enforcement will be provided. 
 
Legislative saga 
 
The legislative initiatives on collective redress resulted from the parallel efforts by DG 
Competition and DG Sanco. Although their policy actions were initially uncoordinated, they 
were both guided by the enforcement gap for large-scale low-value damages in their 
respective fields of EU law infringements. In 2005, DG Competition published a Green Paper 
on Damages Actions for Breach of EU Antitrust Rules, which addressed the 
‘underdevelopment of private enforcement’ and asked whether consumers and purchasers 
with small claims should have a special collective litigation procedure.14 The 2008 White 
Paper envisioned collective redress in the form of opt-in private actions and opt-out 
representative actions for those representatives that constitute qualified entities. 15 
Subsequently, the Commission proposed a Draft Directive that included these forms of 
collective redress, but the Draft was removed from the agenda during the legislative stages.16 
In the end, the Damages Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for 
damages did not include any provisions for collective redress.17 Following a parallel track, 
                                                            
14 European Commission, ‘Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules’ COM (2005) 
672 final. 
15 European Commission, ‘White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules’ COM (2008) 
165 final. 
16 L. Gorywoda, ‘The Emerging EU Legal Regime for Collective Redress: Institutional Dimension and Its Main 
Features’ in A. Nuyts & N.E. Hatzimihail (eds), Cross-Border Class Actions: The European Way (Sellier 
European Law Publishers 2014), p. 178. 
17 Damages Directive (n 2), Recital 13: ‘This Directive should not require Member States to introduce collective 
redress mechanisms for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.’ 
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DG Sanco published a Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress in 2008, which outlined 
the particular problems that consumers face and suggested collective litigation as a possible 
solution.18 The 2009 Consultation Paper was a highly interesting follow-up, which, for the 
first time, identified collective ADR as the redress option that was supported by the majority 
of the respondents and suggested that an architecture could be developed with ‘sticks’ that 
induce the initiation of ADR.19 As a stick, it not only envisioned the existence of collective 
litigation, but also the empowerment of public authorities with skimming-off powers and 
direct compensation orders. 20  As a non-legislative measure, it also suggested that an 
exemplary collective ADR model could be developed and promoted on a voluntary self-
regulatory basis, backed by independent monitoring. 21  Unfortunately, just like with DG 
Competition, DG Sanco did not explore these options or propose any collective redress 
initiatives after that. It is likely that the feedback received in response to their suggested 
approaches had an impact on the Commission’s enthusiasm for collective redress and a 
sector-specific solution. The inclusion of DG Justice in the debate led to a joint public 
consultation by the three Directorates in 2011, aimed at finding a ‘coherent’ European 
approach and signalling the end of developing sector-specific solutions in favour of a 
horizontal collective redress measure.22 It also left out the further exploration of collective 
ADR, as envisioned in DG Sanco’s 2009 Consultation Paper. This development, as it stands 
today, has only resulted in a non-binding 2013 Commission Recommendation on common 
principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress. However, once the Commission 
assesses the implementation efforts by the Member States within four years after the 
publication of the Recommendation (26 July 2017 at the latest), legislative action could 
follow. 
 
Prevailing discourse 
 
The current scene for collective redress is unsatisfactory not only because of its soft law 
outcome, but also due to the positions that were adopted in the Recommendation, policy 
documents and legal scholarship over the last decade. The Recommendation promotes an opt-
                                                            
18 European Commission, ‘Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress’ COM (2008) 794 final. 
19 European Commission, ‘DG SANCO Consultation Paper’, Brussels, May 2009, p. 13-14. 
20 European Commission 2009 (n 19), p. 17; the public enforcer powers were not deemed necessary in case an 
EU-wide legislative instrument for collective redress would be adopted. 
21 European Commission 2009 (n 19), p. 15. 
22  European Commission, ‘Staff Working Document, Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European 
Approach to Collective Redress’ SEC (2011) 173 final. 
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in model, limits the standing of profit-making representative entities, prohibits contingency 
fees and punitive damages, and instils the loser pays principle, which, in combination, are 
unlikely to be financially incentivizing enough for victims with large-scale low-value damage. 
The reason for these ‘safeguards’ is the fierce desire to avoid the US class action model, 
which has been deemed to be a ‘toxic cocktail that should not be introduced in Europe.’23 
Instead of adjusting particular aspects of the model to remove the possibilities for abusive 
litigation, the Recommendation has arguably eliminated all financial incentives from the 
procedure. Empirical evidence would unequivocally suggest that using an opt-in model for 
large-scale low-value damages would be ineffective and result in a low participation rate.24 If 
the same safeguards had been introduced in combination with an opt-out model, it would have 
been more likely to achieve effective private enforcement for the weakest victims. Moreover, 
an opt-out model is no longer foreign to the European legal tradition, as evidenced by the 
numerous opt-out collective devices that have been adopted in recent years.25 Yet, as it 
currently stands, the adoption of a financially-incentivized European collective redress 
litigation device appears to be politically unacceptable, which prompts the exploration of 
alternative avenues.  
 
In the competition law context, these problems have manifested in an additional way. The 
tension between ‘deterrence’ or ‘compensation’ as the appropriate objective for EU private 
enforcement has arguably contributed to the limited collective redress outcomes in the 
Damages Directive. Emphasizing either objective would have an impact not only on the 
policy choices regarding the relationship between public and private enforcement, but also 
regarding the types of mechanisms that will be used for private enforcement. The US has 
approached private enforcement from a deterrence perspective and therefore utilized 
mechanisms, such as class actions, that are most likely to empower private parties to bring 
claims. The EU has acknowledged both deterrence and compensation, but arguably, the 
emphasis has been on the latter. With Courage and Manfredi, the Court of Justice established 
a rights-based corrective justice narrative with the ‘right to full compensation’,26 which is also 
                                                            
23 European Commission, ‘Press Release of 27 November 2008, Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress – 
Questions and Answers’ MEMO/08/741, p. 4. 
24 For example, see the comparative study R. Mulheron, ‘Reform of Collective Redress in England and Wales: A 
Perspective of Need. A Research Paper for Submission to the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales’ 
(2008) Civil Justice Council of England and Wales. 
25 Subject to limitations and sector-specific application, opt-out models are available in the UK, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Bulgaria, Belgium, Portugal and Germany. 
26 Lianos, Davis & Nebbia 2015 (n 6), p. 22; Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297; Joined 
cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi and others [2006] ECR I-6619. 
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represented in Art. 3 of the Damages Directive. This perspective could result in favouring 
enforcement mechanisms that, at least in theory, offer stronger protection for individual rights 
at the expense of the potential deterrence benefits that could be achieved through opt-out 
aggregation. Although the Court and the Commission have repeatedly acknowledged the 
deterrence effects of private enforcement,27 its implications on collective redress mechanisms 
have been limited. As discussed above, the development of a deterrence-oriented mechanism 
was ultimately halted and the rights-based compensation narrative remains predominant. 
 
1.5 Collective ADR in EU law 
 
As evidenced by the policy developments on collective redress, there are no tailor-made 
instruments focusing collective ADR on the EU level yet. However, individual forms of ADR 
have received ample attention in the last decade, resulting in the establishment of minimum 
safeguards that would also apply to collective ADR. Mediation has been a particular subject 
of interest, as illustrated by the adoption of the 2008 Mediation Directive, which harmonised 
several substantive and procedural elements.28 Consumers also benefit from several EU-level 
safeguards. In particular, the Consumer ADR Directive was adopted in 2013, covering claims 
arising from contractual obligations in sales or service contracts between consumers and 
traders in both domestic and cross-border scenarios.29 It set minimum rules on transparency, 
cost, duration, expertise, independence, impartiality and fairness of the ADR entities and 
procedures, and granted monitoring tasks to the competent national authorities. Although its 
scope is limited for the purposes of collective private enforcement of competition law, it 
provides an overview of the minimum protections applicable in consumer ADR contexts, as it 
largely mirrors the Unfair Terms Directive, the Brussels I Regulation and the relevant case 
law. For instance, Art. 1 states that Member States are allowed to make ADR procedures 
mandatory in B2C scenarios, as long as resorting to litigation after the procedure is still 
possible. Art. 10 (1) ensures that pre-dispute agreements are unable to make the outcome of 
the ADR procedure binding on the consumer. Finally, Art. 11 establishes that the outcome 
reached cannot deprive the consumer of the mandatory protections from its Member State of 
                                                            
27 Ioannidou 2015 (n 4), p. 52-62. 
28 Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of 
mediation in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 136. 
29 Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute 
resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC 
(Directive on consumer ADR), OJ L 165. 
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habitual residence. All of these safeguards must be taken into account when developing a 
model of collective ADR. 
 
The following sections will take a closer look at the two instruments that are most closely 
connected to the introduction of a collective ADR mechanism for the private enforcement of 
EU competition law - the Damages Directive and the Commission Recommendation on 
Collective Redress. 
 
Damages Directive 
 
Despite often going unnoticed as one of the features of the Damages Directive,30 collective 
ADR was acknowledged and encouraged in the different parts of the Directive. To begin with, 
Recital 5 stipulates that litigation is just one facet of private enforcement next to ‘alternative 
avenues’. The Directive highlights only one particular benefit of using ADR, which is, 
somewhat surprisingly, not the speed or lower cost of the procedure. Rather, Recital 48 
emphasizes the ‘certainty’ gained from what it refers to as ‘once-and-for-all’ solutions, which 
should be encouraged by including as many victims and infringers in the consensual 
settlement as possible. While such settlements include various efficiency gains, the emphasis 
was placed on the broad scope of private enforcement that could be achieved through the use 
of collective ADR. The different forms and effects of ADR that were prescribed in the 
Directive will be assessed in more detail. 
 
Consensual dispute resolution - Interestingly, the Directive does not use the term ‘alternative 
dispute resolution’, but instead chooses to call it ‘consensual dispute resolution.’ Art. 2 (21) 
defines consensual dispute resolution as ‘any mechanism enabling parties to reach the out-of-
court resolution of a dispute concerning a claim for damages’ and the successful outcome of 
the procedure is defined in Art. 2 (22) as a ‘consensual settlement.’ When comparing this 
concept to the definition of ADR used in this thesis, they could readily be viewed as 
synonyms. Perhaps the reason for using the term ‘consensual’ dispute resolution stems from 
the fact that the Damages Directive primarily envisions a form of consensual negotiation, 
which would lead to an agreement in the form of settlement terms. Yet, such a vision would 
be unnecessarily limiting, although it may very well reflect the most common and efficient 
ADR technique for achieving voluntary compensation. All of the other forms of ADR 
                                                            
30 Damages Directive (n 2). 
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identified in the ADR definition outlined in this thesis would also fall under the definition 
provided by the Directive. There is no conflict because the other forms of ADR are also 
consensual out-of-court processes that culminate with an agreement. The consensus is 
expressed by agreeing to submit the dispute for consideration to a third party, such as an 
arbitral tribunal, Ombudsman or ADR entity, and the decision that the third parties issue 
would serve as the agreement or the settlement terms. The Directive confirms this 
interpretation in Recital 48, which gives examples of consensual dispute resolution, which 
cover not only negotiation-based ADR forms such as mediation and conciliation, but also 
arbitration. 
 
Incentives by the public enforcer - Returning to the broad definition of ADR, Recital 5 names 
‘public enforcement decisions that give parties an incentive to provide compensation’ as an 
example of an alternative private enforcement mechanism. The concept ‘public enforcement 
decisions’ is only mentioned in this particular Recital and is not elaborated upon elsewhere in 
the Directive using that terminology. The inclusion of this example acknowledges and 
promotes the prospect of a public enforcer inducing voluntary compensation through the 
provision of direct incentives. The only manifestation of this public and private enforcement 
fusion can be found in Art. 18 (3), which allows competition authorities to take into account 
successful ADR compensation as a ‘mitigating factor’ in setting the fine. This provision 
strengthens the legitimacy of fine reduction initiatives that include collective ADR. 
 
Suspensive effects - Two important suspensive effects of using collective ADR were clarified. 
Firstly, Art. 18 (1) stipulates that the limitation period will be suspended for the duration of 
ADR procedure. Secondly, Art. 18 (2) stipulates that ongoing litigation proceedings can be 
suspended for up to two years if ADR procedures are initiated. Both the victim and the 
infringer could benefit from the added time for building a stronger case for litigation or for 
reaching a mutually satisfactory settlement. 
 
Joint and several liability - In case of more than one infringing undertaking, the Directive 
articulates the relationship between the infringers that decided to engage in collective ADR 
and settle, and those that did not. In essence, Art. 19 (1) and (2) stipulate that the infringers 
that decided to enter into a consensual settlement should no longer be held jointly and 
severally liable along with the non-settling infringers. This is a coherent consequence of the 
fact that the victim would no longer have any existing harm left vis-à-vis the settling infringer 
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as a result of the compensation received through the settlement. The Directive has thereby 
attempted to increase the certainty felt by a settling infringer and encourage a favourable 
setting for the use of collective ADR. However, this favourable setting is hindered by Art. 19 
(3), which proceeds to give the Member States the discretion to derogate from that outcome in 
case the non-settling infringers are ultimately unable to pay. Foremost, this situation can be 
avoided altogether by explicitly excluding it in the settlement terms. If that was not done, 
however, the goodwill of the setting infringer would be discredited by potentially forcing it to 
compensate for the portion of the harm created by the insolvent co-infringers. As explained in 
Recital 51, this turn of events would be justified by the need to guarantee the right to full 
compensation. At the very least, Recital 52 urges national courts to ‘take into account’ the 
amount of compensation already paid, so that the settling infringer would not have to pay the 
full amounts remaining.  
 
In sum, the Damages Directive has clearly promoted the use of collective ADR for private 
enforcement. Important definitions, suspensive effects and joint and several liability 
implications were outlined. Finally, the most interesting addition from the perspective of 
integrating collective ADR into the broader competition law enforcement architecture - it 
proposed the creation of incentives in the form of fine discounts for voluntary compensation 
efforts. 
 
Recommendation on Collective Redress 
 
Although the bulk of the Recommendation31 is focused on establishing principles for the 
guidance of collective litigation procedures for injunctive and compensatory redress, it also 
addresses and encourages the use of collective ADR. To begin with, paragraph 2 states that 
the procedures designed in accordance with the principles of the Recommendation should be 
‘fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive,’ which is also applicable to collective 
ADR. In particular, the Recommendation highlights one benefit of using collective ADR - 
efficiency. The different forms and effects of ADR that were prescribed will be assessed in 
more detail. 
 
Availability - Recital 16 stipulates that collective ADR should always be available in addition 
to or as a voluntary step within the collective redress litigation proceedings. Furthermore, 
                                                            
31 Commission Recommendation (n 2). 
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paragraphs 25-26 specify that collective ADR can be initiated during the pre-litigation stage 
as well as throughout the subsequent litigation stages prior to the issuing of a judgment. 
Paragraph 25 appears to focus on negotiation-based ADR procedures, which aim to arrive at a 
consensual out-of-court or court-based settlement. A reference was made to the Mediation 
Directive, which harmonized the minimum standards applicable to mediation entities. 
Whereas, paragraph 26 appears to address other ADR procedures (‘appropriate means of 
collective ADR’) and specifies that their ‘use’, which is likely to mean their initiation, should 
be based on consensus. 
 
Suspensive effects - Paragraph 27 states that ongoing litigation proceedings will be suspended 
for the duration of collective ADR proceedings. The Recommendation asserts that ADR 
procedures can come to an end when one or both of the parties ‘expressly withdraw’ from it. 
It is unclear how this would correspond to the functioning of collective ADR mechanisms, 
which are initiated by consensual agreement, but are thereafter autonomous proceedings 
resulting in a binding outcome issued by an ADR entity. 
 
Judicial review - In case of a binding outcome in the form of a settlement, paragraph 28 
stipulates that it should be subjected to court verification on ‘legality’ and that the 
‘appropriate protection of interests and rights of all parties’ should be taken into account. 
Again, it is unclear whether this form of judicial review is reserved exclusively for 
settlements or whether ADR procedures that result in a binding outcome are also included. 
Further, the substantive scope of the review was left ambiguous.32 
 
In sum, the Recommendation on collective redress was brief yet explicit on the necessity of 
ensuring the availability of collective ADR in addition to and throughout collective redress 
litigation proceedings. However, the Recommendation was not entirely consistent or accurate 
in its assessment of the procedures and outcomes resulting from different collective ADR 
procedures. In particular, further distinctions need to be drawn between the procedures 
resulting in a settlement and those resulting in a decision issued by an ADR entity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                            
32 European Law Institute, ‘Statement of the European Law Institute on Collective Redress and Competition 
Damages Claims’, 2014, p. 42. 
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The current state of play regarding the development of effective and efficient EU collective 
devices is unsatisfactory. The use of collective ADR as a private enforcement mechanism has 
not yet been considered as a serious policy option. However, the introduction of collective 
ADR into the private enforcement toolbox would be in perfect accordance with the pro-ADR 
positions advanced in recent years, particularly in the Damages Directive and the 
Recommendation on Collective Redress. Ultimately, it is submitted that collective ADR could 
help close the enforcement gap for large-scale low-value damage if integrated into a 
regulatory enforcement architecture that creates incentives for its voluntary use. The next 
chapters will develop this hypothesis further. 
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Chapter 2: Incentives 
 
Although collective ADR constitutes a distinct private enforcement device, the conceptual 
analysis developed in this section requires looking at the broader context in which it 
functions. In particular, the analytical framework will make use of the term ‘regulatory 
enforcement architecture’, which refers to the sum of the public and private enforcement of 
competition law. Put differently, it is suggested that the effective functioning of collective 
ADR necessitates some degree of fusion between private and public enforcement, and that 
coordination between the two can be mutually beneficial for the achievement of compensation 
and deterrence outcomes.33  With that in mind, the following questions will be explored 
further: How could the voluntary use of collective ADR be triggered? What should be its 
relationship with the other components of the architecture? The normative objective of the 
analysis is to identify key elements of an architectural model that is capable of successfully 
integrating collective ADR and thereby providing compensation to all victims, particularly to 
those suffering large-scale low-value damage. In order to trigger the ‘voluntary and 
consensual’ use of collective ADR, the architecture needs to provide incentives for two 
categories of entities: (1) the infringing undertakings, and (2) the victims and their 
representatives. After exploring these incentives, this section will conclude by sketching the 
basic structure of a behaviourally-informed regulatory enforcement architecture. 
 
2.1 Infringing undertakings 
 
Designing an architecture that induces ‘voluntary compensation’ efforts through collective 
ADR from undertakings that have infringed competition law, calls for critical inquiries into 
behavioural research and regulatory enforcement theories. In order to shed some empirical 
light on the behaviour of infringers, this section will cover findings from social psychology, 
management studies and self-regulatory compliance programmes. As a word of caution, 
behavioural research is often criticised for the notorious difficulty of drawing general 
conclusions from complex, conditional and relational findings. 34  Despite the possible 
epistemic, institutional and normative objections to utilizing behavioural findings in law and 
                                                            
33 It is accepted that the private enforcement of competition law is capable of achieving not just compensation 
but also deterrence objectives; European Commission 2008a (n 15), p. 3. 
34  Addressing the ‘nudge-scepticism’ of using behavioural research for law and regulation, see P. Cserne, 
‘Making Sense of Nudge-Scepticism: The Challenges to EU Law’s Learning from Behavioural Sciences’ in A. 
Alemanno & A.-L. Sibony (eds), Nudge and the Law: A European Perspective (Hart Publishing 2015). 
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regulation, certain data has found widespread recognition and will be discussed below.35 As a 
final disclaimer, behavioural research will be explored in order to confirm the possibility of 
infringers initiating collective ADR, which will be viewed as a form of compliance. The 
effects of behavioural research on competition policy, substantive competition law and its 
public enforcement - meaning compliance more broadly - are not explicitly assessed. 
 
Undertakings with economic, social and normative motivations 
 
As a starting point, undertakings will be viewed as multidimensional entities that operate in 
complex contexts under the influence of laws and regulation. 36  These entities can 
simultaneously be viewed as collections of individuals with different characteristics and 
ambitions, tied together through organizational structures. Individual behaviour is impacted 
by an organizational structure that incorporates the intersections of different interests, 
behaviours and norms. Yet, the public enforcement of EU competition law is largely based on 
a more one-dimensional view of undertakings, which rests upon the neoclassical 
microeconomic assumption that they are unitary and rational utility-maximizing entities that 
only comply with the law if it is their economic interest to do so.37 In recent decades, 
enforcement strategies from other disciplines have started to build upon the rationality 
assumption and often employ a two-dimensional distinction between ‘good faith’ and ‘bad 
faith’ undertakings. The good faith undertakings are viewed as having internalised moral 
norms and are deemed willing to act upon them under certain circumstances, whereas bad 
faith undertakings would only consider norms as external restraints and act exclusively on the 
basis of economic self-interest. 38  It is implied that for rational, bad faith undertakings, 
infringements would be conscious decisions to violate the law.39 If the rationality assumption 
is a guiding principle of the enforcement strategy, then a conclusion that generally follows is 
that enforcement design should be aimed at the bad faith undertakings, who require a 
                                                            
35 A. Alemanno & A.-L. Sibony (eds), Nudge and the Law: A European Perspective (Hart Publishing, 2015), p. 
3. 
36 C. Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (Cambridge University Press 
2002), p. 5. 
37 A.R. Mele & P. Rawling (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (Oxford University Press 2004), p. 381-
384. 
38 Y. Feldman & H.E. Smith, ‘Behavioral Equity’ (2014) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics Vol. 
170, 137, p. 138. 
39 S.S. Simpson & M. Rorie, ‘Motivating Compliance: Economic and Material Motives for Compliance’ in C. 
Parker & V.L. Nielsen (eds), Explaining Compliance: Business Responses to Regulation (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2011), p.60. 
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sufficient amount of deterrence in order to comply.40 Although this is a convenient paradigm, 
empirical findings suggest that the distinction between the two categories might not be clear-
cut in all circumstances, since even good faith undertakings are capable of displaying 
opportunistic behaviour. 41  This can be particularly pertinent if their goodwill is not 
acknowledged and given an appropriate outlet. A fundamental conclusion that will be 
elaborated upon later, is that focusing on the bad faith undertakings and using an exclusively 
deterrence-oriented strategy would lead to a failure to make use of the untapped potential of 
good faith undertakings and compliance-oriented avenues. It is clear that for undertakings that 
exclusively require economic incentives to initiate collective ADR, the architecture must 
simply make voluntary compensation an economically rational option. However, the main 
focus of the subsequent discussions on behavioural research is on the exploration of non-
economic incentives and how to best make use of them. 
 
Behavioural findings have put forth several considerations that explain why undertakings - as 
collections of individuals with cognitive limitations - behave in a particular way. The 
following five considerations will be deemed most relevant for explaining collective ADR, 
when viewed as voluntary compensation or a form of compliance: (1) Individuals respond to 
social influences, which means that they are influenced by what they perceive to be the 
behaviour, knowledge and beliefs of others around them. 42  Therefore, when individuals 
perceive that others want to comply, then they could be more likely to comply themselves. 
However, various organizational pressures are capable of undermining such compliance 
motivations, e.g. the encouragement of risk-taking to advance, the lack of personal 
responsibility towards the outcome, the submission to group decisions in order to avoid 
conflicts and the discouragement of whistleblowing in the name of loyalty to the 
undertaking. 43  Some of these individual-organization tensions could be overcome by 
connecting the individual will to comply with the profitability and economic rationality of the 
undertaking. This connection is often exemplified by making a ‘business case’ for self-
regulatory compliance programmes and corporate social responsibility. 44   (2) Individuals 
                                                            
40 I. Ayres & J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University 
Press 1992), p. 20. 
41 C. Hodges, Law and Corporate Behaviour: Integrating Theories of Regulation, Enforcement, Compliance and 
Ethics (Hart Publishing 2015), p. 30-31. 
42 A. Alemanno & A.-L. Sibony (eds), Nudge and the Law: A European Perspective (Hart Publishing, 2015), p. 
4. 
43 Parker 2002 (n 36), p. 33-36. 
44 E.C. Kurucz, B.A. Colbert & D. Wheeler, ‘The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility’ in A. 
Crane (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (Oxford University Press 2008), p. 85-92. 
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could be more likely to comply when they perceive the compliance objectives and processes 
to be legitimate and procedurally fair. 45  This suggests that the promotion of a genuine 
compliance culture could increase the individual motivation towards to comply. For instance, 
successful self-regulatory compliance programmes generally have the following features: 
managerial support and commitment, integration into decision-making procedures, designated 
compliance personnel, public regulator pressures, private stakeholder pressures through civil 
justice systems, and stakeholder involvement through public opinion. 46  (3) Individuals 
experience inertia, meaning they tend to stick to the status quo and not work towards long-
term change, even if it is in their best interest to do so.47 Therefore, if the status quo within an 
organization is to comply, then individuals are more likely to accept it as a given and act 
accordingly. (4) Individuals are influenced by the framing and presentation of information. 
Ambiguity and flexibility about the process of compliance could increase ‘moral 
deliberations’ on how to comply with the given rules and objectives.48 In some contexts, 
leaving discretion on how comply could create space for compliance motivations to emerge. 
(5) Individuals have been found to have difficulties in the rational assessment of the 
probabilities and risks involved with certain types of conduct. 49  This suggests that 
infringements could sometimes be the result of poorly calculated misperceptions and 
‘entrepreneurial delusion’, rather than perfectly calculated economic thinking.50 For instance, 
decision-making is often based on intuition, information is taken into account selectively and 
when the economic or personal stakes are higher, the likelihood of taking risks becomes 
greater.51 Ultimately, it is submitted that a fuller understanding of the cognitive limitations of 
individuals and organizations might improve the effectiveness of existing enforcement 
strategies. 
 
                                                            
45 T.R. Tyler, ‘The Psychology of Self-Regulation: Normative Motivations for Compliance’ in C. Parker & V.L. 
Nielsen (eds), Explaining Compliance: Business Responses to Regulation (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011), p. 
84-85. This has been challenged by some research; for an ADR-based example regarding voluntary compliance 
with Ombudsman decisions, see N. Creutzfeldt, ‘How Important is Procedural Justice for Consumer Dispute 
Resolution? A Case Study of an Ombudsman Model for European Consumers’ (2014) Journal of Consumer 
Policy Vol. 37, 527. 
46 Parker 2002 (n 36), p. 50. 
47 C.R. Sunstein, ‘Empirically Informed Regulation’ (2011) The University of Chicago Law Review Vol. 78(4), 
1349, p. 1350-1351. 
48 Feldman & Smith 2014 (n 38), p. 147. 
49 Sunstein 2011 (n 47), p. 1358-1359. 
50 Hodges 2015 (n 41), p. 23. 
51 S. Bhattacharya & R. Van den Bergh, ‘The Contribution of Management Studies to Understanding Firm 
Behaviour and Competition Law’ (2014) World Competition Vol. 37(4), 517, p. 521-522. 
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While these behavioural findings provide some insights into how to fine-tune the incentives 
provided by the regulatory enforcement architecture, they also reveal that human behaviour 
can be a complex variable, which is subject to a number of influences other than law and 
regulation. Some undertakings will comply for the sake of complying, others can be 
persuaded or threatened to do so; some undertakings are perfect profit-maximizing entities, 
whereas others do not live up to that standard. Undertakings could also be motivated by a 
combination of factors, which can change through time and depend on the context and 
individuals involved. The best a regulatory enforcement architecture can do is to respond to 
this plurality of behavioural considerations by providing an avenue towards compliance 
outcomes for as many undertakings as possible. In doing so, deterrence should be viewed as a 
necessary backup to ensure the success of the architecture, but compliance should be 
facilitated as the first choice strategy for those that would be willing to comply if given the 
right incentives. As will be elaborated later in the section, the integration of collective ADR 
into the regulatory enforcement architecture would be illustrative of such a ‘compliance-
oriented’  strategy. 
 
Case study: Lufthansa and the air cargo cartel 
 
Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies about the particular behavioural processes that 
have led to the initiation of collective ADR in a competition infringement scenario. However, 
an illuminating example of such behaviour could be brought from the recent air cargo cartel, 
which involved price-fixing behaviour on surcharges between some of the biggest airline 
companies in the world, spanning between 1999-2006. 52 Lufthansa ‘discovered’ the cartel 
shortly after creating an internal compliance programme and proceeded to approach all of the 
competition authorities in relevant jurisdictions to report the cartel with a plea for leniency. 
The public prosecution of the air cargo cartel resulted in more than 2,5 billion euros worth of 
fines worldwide,53 with 799 million euros fined by the European Commission in 2010.54 The 
public enforcement was followed by private enforcement efforts, including collective redress 
                                                            
52 The infringement decision was subsequently appealed and the General Court annulled most of the decisions in 
December 2015; Cases T-9/11 Air Canada, T-28/11 Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, T-36/11 Japan 
Airlines, T-38/11 Cathay Pacific Airways, T-39/11 Cargolux Airlines International, T-40/11 Latam Airlines 
Group and Others, T-43/11 Singapore Airlines and Others, T-46/11 Deutsche Lufthansa and Others, T-48/11 
British Airways, T-56/11 SAS Cargo Group and Others, T-62/11 Air France-KLM, T-63/11 Société Air France 
and T-67/11 Martinair Holland v Commission. 
53 H. Bergman & D.D. Sokol, ‘The Air Cargo Cartel: Lessons for Compliance’ in Beaton-Wells & Tran (eds), 
Anti-Cartel Enforcement In A Contemporary Age: Leniency Religion (Hart Publishing 2015), p. 302. 
54 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Fines 11 Air Cargo Carriers €799 Million in Price Fixing 
Cartel’ IP/10/1487, Brussels, 9 November 2010.  
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litigation in the form of class actions in the US. Lufthansa’s actions in the air cargo cartel are 
illuminating not just for the role that their (1) self-regulatory compliance programme and (2) 
leniency application played, but also for their (3) voluntary use of collective ADR to 
compensate the victims even prior to the publication of the infringement decision. Thanks to 
the research conducted by Bergman and Sokol,55 we have insights into the behind-the-scenes 
development of these steps through to the interviews with Lufthansa’s in-house legal and 
compliance counsel. The aim of this sub-section is not to summarize their work, but to point 
out the key empirical findings that are of special relevance for understanding voluntary 
behaviour in the context of this thesis. 
 
Lufthansa is a large undertaking with diverse airline services and total annual revenues 
exceeding 30 billion euros.56 Its Compliance Office was created in 2003 at the persistence of 
the General Counsel von Ruckteschell and as a response to the compliance failure scandals in 
the US and EU at the time. Compliance with competition law was deemed as the main 
priority of the programme and was made binding as internal policy in 2004. Lufthansa made 
genuine attempts to develop a compliance culture with regards to competition law by securing 
the support of top executives, as well as by educating managers and employees through 
lectures and meetings, both in person and online.57 According to Lufthansa, employees were 
encouraged to speak up and report any concerns without suffering adverse consequences. Due 
to the lack of a strictly hierarchical corporate structure, employees were able to cooperate and 
communicate freely between different units. Lufthansa also stressed the importance of 
integrating lawyers into its business operations, so that their presence would become a natural 
part of the decision-making processes.  Shortly after these compliance activities had been 
initiated, employees reported to the Compliance Office that price-fixing activities with other 
airline companies had been going on for years and that such ‘negotiations’ were thought to be 
legal or even required by law.58 When the findings were presented to the executive board, it 
allegedly took them only 10 minutes of deliberation to authorize bringing the cartel to the 
attention of competition authorities and seeking leniency. Lufthansa’s compliance and legal 
teams started collaborating with external legal counsel and embarked upon full cooperation 
with competition authorities in 2006 - an expensive process that lasted for three years, but 
ultimately, Lufthansa received full immunity in all jurisdictions. Shortly after the 
                                                            
55 Bergman & Sokol 2015 (n 53), p. 301-314. 
56 Lufthansa, ‘Annual Report 2014’, Frankfurt, March 2015.  
57 Bergman & Sokol 2015 (n 53), p. 308-309. 
58 Bergman & Sokol 2015 (n 53), p. 310. 
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investigations became public, Lufthansa became the target of 20 class action claims in the US 
and one in Canada. According to Lufthansa, their decision to engage into collective ADR and 
seek an out-of-court settlement was the result of: (1) a cost-benefit analysis, and (2) 
reputational considerations.59 Despite paying out 85 million euros in settlements,60 some of 
which were considered to be ‘overstated figures’ by the claimants, Lufthansa believes that by 
voluntarily settling the claims even prior to the rendering of the infringement decision, they 
not only saved money by avoiding class action proceedings, but also protected their 
reputation in the airline industry.61 
 
In sum, it is clear that voluntary behaviour in the form of whistleblowing to receive leniency 
is considered to be an indispensable element of the EU competition enforcement architecture. 
Leniency as a form of compliance fits well into the deterrence-oriented enforcement strategy 
that public enforcement employs. The use of leniency is substantiated by the rationality 
assumption, whereby under certain circumstances, betraying the cartel is assumed to become 
economically more beneficial than continuing the participation in the collusive behaviour.62 
Yet, other forms of voluntary behaviour such as self-regulatory compliance programmes or 
voluntary compensation through collective ADR are not expressly promoted or rewarded. 
This could be due to the inability to explain such compliance behaviour using a deterrence-
oriented rationale. However, as evidenced by the experience of Lufthansa, the inclusion of 
undertakings in the prevention, detection and mitigation of competition law violations should 
not disregarded, since as a calculated element of a regulatory enforcement architecture it 
could prove to be a source of untapped potential. This thesis focuses on its potential for 
private enforcement, particularly through the encouragement of collective ADR and other 
voluntary compensation efforts. 
 
2.2 Victims and their representatives 
 
Obtaining the consent of the infringing undertaking could be deemed as the biggest 
impediment to the initiation of collective ADR, which is why the regulatory enforcement 
architecture is predominantly oriented towards the infringers. Once the infringers are offering 
to consider voluntary compensation, victims and their representatives would be likely to 
                                                            
59 Bergman & Sokol 2015 (n 53), p. 312. 
60 Lufthansa, ‘Annual Report 2006’, Cologne, March 2007.  
61 Bergman & Sokol 2015 (n 53), p. 312. 
62 Bhattacharya & Van den Bergh 2014 (n 51), p. 517. 
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explore that opportunity. Next to the increasingly secure prospects of receiving compensation, 
the victims and their representatives could also be incentivized the informal and non-judicial 
nature of collective ADR proceedings, which generates speed, lower cost, confidentiality and 
procedural flexibility. Next to these ‘inherent incentives’, there are two particular issues that 
must be addressed for the successful functioning of collective ADR within the regulatory 
enforcement architecture. 
 
Victims - With collective ADR, the victims would constitute as ‘non-participating parties’ to 
the proceedings, since they would ultimately be represented by a third entity. The direct 
incentives that can be provided for the victims mainly occur at the stage, where they must 
either opt-in or opt-out of the collective proceedings. In case the victims suffered large-scale 
low-value damage, individual activity levels would be very low due to the low value of the 
claim and the incentives that can be provided to spur any form of victim participation would 
thereby be limited as well. The choice between an opt-in or an opt-out model is therefore 
critical for the success of collective proceedings, for both the ADR and litigation varieties. 
Using opt-in as the default regime has been empirically proven to lead to lower participation 
rates, especially with low-value claims, whereby the victims might often not be aware of their 
claim at all.63 To illustrate, the only opt-in collective competition damages claim brought 
under the UK’s pre-reform Competition Act 1998 was the 2007 JJB Sports case, which 
achieved compensation for approximately 0.1% of the victims affected.64 In comparison, the 
Dutch opt-out settlement regime produced a participation rate of approximately 97% of the 
victims affected in the 2007 Dexia securities case. While the exact figures can vary, it is clear 
that any type of activity levels - whether to opt-in or opt-out - are very low with low-value 
claims, so if the aim of the enforcement architecture is to ensure that as many victims as 
possible receive compensation, then an opt-out model should be preferred. As discussed in 
chapter 1, the EU-level policy discussions on collective redress were largely focused on 
avoiding opt-out models for a number of reasons, including the desire to avoid a US-style 
litigious culture and to safeguard individual procedural rights. This was reflected in the 2013 
Commission Recommendation on Collective Redress, which explicitly promoted an opt-in 
                                                            
63  Z. Juska, ‘Obstacles in European Competition Law Enforcement: A Potential Solution From Collective 
Redress’ (2014) European Journal of Legal Studies Vol.7(1), 125, p. 143. For an overview on the advantages 
and disadvantages of both models, see Mulheron 2008 (n 24). 
64 UK Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 'Private Actions in Competition Law: A Consultation on 
Options for Reform’, April 2012, p. 11; The Consumer Association v JJB Sports Plc (2007) CAT Case No. 
1078/7/9/07. 
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model as the default option, only allowing opt-out in exceptional cases.65 However, in light of 
the considerations above, this approach should be reconsidered. The possibility of an opt-out 
model for collective litigation would increase the threat of litigation and thereby induce the 
use of collective ADR within the regulatory enforcement architecture. Likewise, the 
possibility of an opt-out model for collective ADR would increase its attractiveness for the 
infringers, who could thereby achieve international ‘once-and-for-all’ solutions and limit their 
exposure to multiple claims for an extended period of time. In sum, although the exact scope 
of the coverage for collective ADR outcomes it is ultimately up to the parties to consensually 
decide, the architecture should at least facilitate the possibility of an opt-out application to 
ensure the overall success of the system for large-scale  low-value claims. 
 
Representatives - The direct incentives that the architecture could create for representative 
entities regard their funding. Although collective ADR is likely to involve fewer expenses 
than collective litigation, even the most informal negotiation-based forms of ADR are not 
costless. Once the infringer’s consent has been induced by the architecture, then the offer to 
start collective ADR proceedings or to receive a complete redress scheme can be incentivizing 
enough for the representative entities or their funders due to the high certainty of receiving 
their share of the compensation. However, particularly in case the threat of collective 
litigation needs to be established in order for collective ADR to be induced in the first place, 
additional financial incentives for representative entities would be needed. There are at least 
six categories of funding sources that could be relevant for collective redress scenarios: (1) 
contingency fees, (2) legal aid, (3) individual contributions, (4) insurance, (5) special funds, 
(6) third party funding. When considering the merits of these funding options, it should be 
kept in mind that the 'loser pays’ principle,66 which is applied in most Member States,67 
already creates major disincentives to start an action, which is why a combination of adequate 
funding mechanisms is imperative. Contingency fees allow the representative to make 
representation fees contingent on a successful outcome, which could incentivize law firms in 
particular; however, only a few Member States allow them and the Commission 2013 
                                                            
65 Commission Recommendation (n 2), Recital 21, exceptions allowed in case such actions would be ‘duly 
justified by reasons of sound administration of justice’. 
66 The ‘loser pays’ principle stipulates that the losing party would have to cover the legal costs of the opposing 
party. 
67 Juska 2014 (n 63), p. 133. 
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Recommendation on Collective Redress explicitly prohibited such practices.68 National legal 
aid is often very limited and unlikely to cover cross-border situations. 69  Individual 
contributions are likely to be insignificant in case the victims suffered large-scale low-value 
damage. Likewise, insurance for legal expenses is likely to be restricted when it comes to 
collective proceedings. Special funds could be a great solution, whether European or national, 
if pooled with the help of donations from successful claimants, confiscated profits, injunctive 
orders, competition law violation fines, cy-près damages or crowdfunding.70 Finally, third 
party funding could be the most viable option, whereby the representative entity would be 
funded by another entity that would receive a portion of the final compensation amount.71 
Such funding could also be provided on a contingency basis, however, the 2013 Commission 
Recommendation on Collective Redress prohibited this form of contingency as well. 72 
Overall, the particular funding arrangements that are deemed most appropriate for collective 
proceedings could be left for the Member States to determine. When making such policy 
decisions, it should be considered that each funding arrangement could be individually 
scrutinized during an ex post fairness review of the final outcomes of collective ADR. 
Ultimately, representative entities should have sufficient incentives to represent victims in 
collective ADR proceedings, as long as Member States do not create significant restrictions 
for third party funding and legal counsel fees. 
 
2.3 Designing a regulatory enforcement architecture 
 
In order to develop a well-informed architecture that takes behavioural intricacies and 
multilayered incentives into account, this section will start exploring enforcement theories 
that can help guide the manner in which collective ADR is integrated into the architecture. 
 
Enforcement theories aim to uncover effective and efficient strategies that would ensure the 
fulfillment of the regulatory objectives. However, these theories often present idealised 
                                                            
68 Commission Recommendation (n 2), Recital 31, exceptions allowed in case Member States ‘provide for 
appropriate national regulation of those fees in collective redress cases, taking into account in particular the right 
to full compensation of the members of the claimant party’ 
69 European Law Institute 2014 (n 32), p. 33. 
70 European Law Institute 2014 (n 32), p. 34. 
71 R. Mulheron, ‘Third Party Funding and Class Actions Reform’ (2015) Law Quarterly Review Vol. 131(Apr), 
291, p. 294. 
72 Commission Recommendation (n 2), Recital 32, the only exception: ‘unless that funding arrangement is 
regulated by a public authority to ensure the interests of the parties’. 
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hypotheticals that are unlikely to be found in the real world in their purest prescribed form.73 
At one end of the spectrum, there exist several variations of the command-and-control theory, 
which is still the primary approach used by competition law public enforcers. These strategies 
are based on the idea that the prescribed standards of conduct will be enforced using coercion, 
deterrence or ‘punishment’ in the form of criminal or civil sanctions. At the other end of the 
spectrum, there are incentive-based theories, which do not rely on coercion, but rather attempt 
to ‘persuade’ the regulatees into compliance.74 In between these two extremes lie enforcement 
theories that can be considered a more accurate representation of what an optimal regulatory 
enforcement mix might look like in practice. They entail a pluralistic, responsive, reflexive 
and smart approach that provides an avenue for different punish-and-persuade synergy 
scenarios of inducing compliance. These intermediate enforcement theories are deemed most 
relevant for guiding the use of collective ADR and will be explored further. 
 
As the seminal work that sparked a mass of research in the field of regulatory enforcement, 
Ayres and Braithwaite’s ‘responsive regulation’ theory takes into account the plurality of 
motivations that different undertakings have for complying with rules and concludes that a 
one-size-fits-all strategy would be ineffective. Instead, the theory prescribes that the regulator 
should respond to the behaviour of undertakings in a tit-for-tat manner, with the starting point 
always being voluntary compliance. The starting point of voluntary compliance is important 
as not to punish the undertakings that are willing to comply, in addition to the fact that, from 
the regulator’s perspective, persuasion would generally be cheaper than punishment.75 If the 
undertaking does not comply voluntarily, then the regulator can escalate their response in an 
enforcement pyramid that leads up to the strongest sanction, which could be, for instance, a 
criminal penalty.76 It is essential that a regulator possesses a ‘big stick’ penalty, however, this 
stick would ideally never have to be used for more than a light ‘tap on the shoulder’,77 since 
its very existence would be enough to induce voluntary compliance. 78  The theory of 
responsive regulation has spanned a family of different theories that are based on the same 
core idea - responsiveness - but which move beyond some of the limits set by the enforcement 
                                                            
73 N. Gunningham, ‘Enforcement and Compliance Strategies’ in R. Baldwin, M. Cave & M. Lodge (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford University Press 2010), p. 122. 
74 N. Gunningham, ‘Strategizing Compliance and Enforcement: Responsive Regulation and Beyond’ in C. 
Parker & V.L. Nielsen (eds), Explaining Compliance: Business Responses to Regulation (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2011), p. 199. 
75 Ayres & Braithwaite 1992 (n 40), p. 19. 
76 Ayres & Braithwaite 1992 (n 40), p. 35-39. 
77 C. Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems: A New Framework 
for Collective Redress in Europe (Hart Publishing 2008), p. 212. 
78 Ayres & Braithwaite 1992 (n 40), p. 40-41. 
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pyramid.79 The follow-ups have also highlighted some criticisms about the appropriateness of 
a rigid gradual escalation in serious risk and single interaction situations.80 For instance, 
Gunningham and Grabosky’s ‘smart regulation’ theory builds upon responsive regulation by 
adding new surrogate regulators and regulatory tools to the mix. It includes commercial and 
non-commercial actors and third parties, who can deploy different regulatory methods to 
affect behaviour.81 The theory does not limit itself to escalating enforcement action within a 
single enforcement pyramid and allows for escalation interactions between the different sides 
of a three-dimensional enforcement pyramid by different actors.82 While the focal point in 
each of these responsive theories can differ, they share common principles that can prove to 
be helpful even when applied in broader enforcement contexts. 
 
Responsive private enforcement: carrots and sticks 
 
A straightforward application of the enforcement theories described above to ‘private 
enforcement’ would not be entirely sound. The controversy stems from the fact that private 
enforcement is not a form of ‘enforcement’ as it is traditionally understood.83 In particular, 
enforcement by private actors through the civil justice system does not always fit easily 
within the enforcement theories that are built upon the archetype of a public regulator. 
Moreover, the objective of the civil justice system is not governance in the direct sense as it is 
with public regulation. However, modern enforcement theories commonly recognise that a 
wide range of actors and tools could be utilised to achieve the desired outcomes. This 
connects to what some authors have identified as a broader ‘transformation of enforcement’, 
which also regards the functions and methods traditionally deployed for public and private 
                                                            
79 Many enforcement theories in the responsive regulation family do not concentrate on the compliance and 
deterrence dichotomy in a hierarchical setting, but mainly highlight additional aspects of enforcement strategy. 
For instance, Baldwin and Black’s ‘really responsive regulation’ theory focuses on a holistic performance 
assessment by extending the rationale of responsiveness to additional aspects of the broader regulatory 
enforcement architecture, such as the undertakings’ internal frameworks, broader institutional frameworks, 
interactions between different regulatory strategies, performance of the regulatory architecture, and finally, 
towards any changes to the aforementioned elements; R. Baldwin & J. Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ 
(2008) Modern Law Review Vol. 71(1), 59, p. 61. Another example regards ‘risk- or problem-based regulation’ 
theories, which focus on the objectives and targeting of enforcement rather than the particulars of the regulatory 
response; R. Baldwin, M. Cave & M. Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice (Oxford 
University Press 2012), p. 268. 
80 Baldwin & Black 2008 (n 79), p. 62-64. 
81 Baldwin, Cave & Lodge 2012 (n 79), p. 266. 
82 Gunningham 2011 (n 74), p. 200. 
83 D. Ashton & D. Henry, Competition Damages Actions in the EU: Law and Practice (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2013), p. 3, fn. 9. 
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enforcement. 84  When abandoning a binary distinction between public and private 
enforcement, a more functional hybrid approach can emerge.85 If the responsive theories were 
applied in a functional manner to a regulatory enforcement architecture integrating collective 
ADR, then the following principles would emerge:  (1) An exclusively deterrence-based 
approach is not effective as a first choice strategy. Behavioural findings would even suggest 
that sticking with a confrontational deterrence strategy could lead to the development of 
defensiveness and intentional non-cooperation on behalf of the infringing undertakings.86 The 
cooperative and consensual nature of collective ADR as the compliance-oriented first choice 
strategy would offer an outlet for the distinct economic, social and normative motivations that 
undertakings possess. Only in situations where collective ADR was unable to result in 
compensation, should the enforcement escalate to collective litigation, which serve a 
deterrence-oriented function. (2) Enforcement results could be reached more effectively and 
efficiently by granting a degree of freedom to the regulatees for figuring out how to meet the 
regulatory goals, while making full use of their resources and knowledge.87 Collective ADR 
could provide this flexibility and directly involve the infringing undertakings in the 
dispensing of compensation, especially when compared to litigation alternatives. 
Furthermore, using the information and resources of the infringing undertakings to dispense 
redress could be more cost-effective than using the resources of the court system and thereby, 
the resources of the victims and other non-victim taxpayers. (3) The regulatory enforcement 
strategy should not undermine the desirable characteristics of the social practice that it is 
ultimately regulating.88 This would be particularly prevalent in case the pro-competition and 
pro-consumer goodwill that manifests in the form of voluntary compensation and other 
compliance efforts would not be taken into account by the architecture. The rewarding of 
collective ADR could take various direct and indirect forms, which will be outlined in more 
detail below. 
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Building upon the principles above, a responsive strategy would suggest that compensation 
becomes more likely if infringing undertakings were provided a range of private enforcement 
avenues to follow, while presenting collective ADR as the first choice. These avenues could 
be offered by various surrogate regulators, who do not necessarily have to be public enforcers. 
A typical collective ADR avenue would result in a consensual agreement between the 
infringing undertaking and the victims as surrogate regulators, which would fulfill the 
regulatory objective of compensation. This process could be aided by various incentives 
provided by public enforcers, courts, victims, third parties, institutional and procedural 
characteristics, which would take the form of a compliance-oriented carrot or a deterrence-
oriented stick. Although both sets of incentives are aimed at inducing voluntary 
compensation, the difference in their presentation could result in distinct behavioural effects 
on undertakings, who possess diverse motivations and capacities to comply.  
 
Carrots - A direct carrot incentive could be a fine reduction that is issued by the public 
enforcer in case the collective ADR took place before or in the course of the investigation 
procedure. The fine reduction could result from considering compensation as a mitigating 
factor in the fining guidelines or as a result of following a more regulated collective ADR 
avenue prescribed by the public enforcer. Such incentives would be less attractive for those 
infringers that received full immunity from the fines through leniency, unless considerations 
would be given to an amendment to the leniency policy that adds compensation as a condition 
for full immunity. Next to the public enforcer incentives, collective ADR also holds inherent 
carrot incentives derived from its procedural characteristics, which would have to be 
facilitated by the architecture. As an informal and non-judicial device, it offers speed, lower 
cost, confidentiality and procedural flexibility. As a voluntary device, it harbours distinct 
reputational benefits that could be used by infringers, whose business models are sensitive to 
public perception. As a consensual device, it allows the infringers to display cooperative traits 
that can be used to remedy pre-existing business or consumer relationships. Depending on the 
procedural rules applicable to collective ADR regarding its opt-in or opt-out application, and 
the recognition and enforcement of its outcomes, it could serve as the device for achieving 
once-and-for-all international settlements, which allows the infringers to avoid multiple 
dispute resolution processes and minimize their global exposure to litigation. 
 
Sticks - A direct stick incentive could be the threat of collective litigation. Legislators and 
courts could provide additional incentives by taking the prior use of collective ADR into 
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account; for instance, when deciding whether a claim should proceed on an opt-in or opt-out 
basis, or when determining the distribution of the costs of litigation. Moreover, certain 
procedural characteristics of collective ADR that were highlighted as potential carrot 
incentives for some infringers, could serve as stick incentives for others in case collective 
litigation operates with the same characteristics. In particular, the broad coverage of victims 
through opt-out application and guaranteed recognition and enforcement, could make the 
threat of collective litigation more intense. Even if the alternative is to enter into collective 
ADR proceedings with the same characteristics, the informal and flexible arena could be the 
‘lesser evil’ for many infringers. Next to litigation, the refusal to try collective ADR, when 
proposed by the victims, could serve as an aggravating factor in the fining guidelines, which 
would be analogous to the fine reductions offered by the public enforcer. Since collective 
ADR is ultimately a voluntary device, then the aggravating aspect of their refusal would have 
to be supported by additional circumstances, such as the deliberate misleading of the victim 
representatives with the purpose of increasing their financial expenditure or weakening their 
potential litigation claim. 
 
As evident from the discussions above, there are limits to what the biggest deterrence stick 
can be within the boundaries of ‘private enforcement’. Unless even greater fusion between 
private and public enforcement is sought, then the public enforcer’s powers will be limited to 
influencing the consensual compensation process by the private actors. Further fusion 
between public and private could result in a stronger stick; for example, the public enforcer 
could directly order the payment of compensation themselves or have the opportunity to 
represent the victims in collective litigation proceedings. However, the architecture 
envisioned in this thesis will limit itself to private enforcement with mere inducements from 
public enforcers, since proposing further measures would warrant a deeper assessment of the 
roles of public and private enforcement of competition law, which is not the aim of the 
present inquiry. 89  While public enforcers are given an important role in achieving 
compensation within the regulatory enforcement architecture envisioned in this thesis, it will 
not go as far as to suggest that ensuring compensation should be the direct task of public 
enforcers. 
  
                                                            
89 For a discussion on competition authorities dispensing redress, see Hodges 2011 (n 85) and Ioannidou 2015 (n 
4), p. 171. 
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In sum, the attraction of a responsive enforcement strategy is derived from the plurality of 
actors, incentives, behavioural considerations and approaches involved. If behavioural 
findings suggest that the affected parties would use collective ADR under certain 
circumstances, then the architecture should set up the relevant incentives in a way the induces 
such outcomes. Ultimately, when executed effectively, using collective ADR as a tool of 
private enforcement would not only result in compensation for the victims, but it would 
achieve it in the most optimal manner with the consent of all parties involved. 
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Chapter 3: Safeguards 
 
A wholesome understanding collective ADR as a tool of private enforcement should not only 
focus on its role within a regulatory enforcement architecture, but also on its implications for 
the civil justice right to the restoration of harm. This section will tread more traditional 
themes associated with ADR and collective redress, and address the following questions: 
What should be the procedural characteristics of a collective ADR device in order to achieve 
effective and efficient outcomes? How to ensure fairness guarantees within informal out-of-
court collective proceedings that feature non-participating victims? The analysis subjects 
collective ADR to the scrutiny of access to justice considerations in an attempt to establish 
additional elements that should inform its use within the architecture envisioned. When 
addressing the criticisms, risks and rights-capabilities of collective ADR, comparisons will be 
drawn against its formal adjudicative counterpart, collective litigation. 
 
3.1 When, how and under what circumstances 
 
Few would fundamentally dispute the potential contributions of ADR to increasing access to 
justice, seeing as the last decades have moved the question of whether the use of ADR is 
appropriate from ‘for or against’ to ‘when, how and under what circumstances.’ 90  In 
particular, concerns can arise when ADR is applied collectively in mass harm cases and in 
areas that fall within the public policy domain; both of which would be present when 
proposing the use of collective ADR for the private enforcement of competition law. On a 
conceptual level, the critique of collective ADR in this context is largely based on the private 
nature of the redress mechanism and the inherent value that is bestowed upon judicial 
determination. Despite their formal independence, courts are an extension of state power and 
while they have the capacity to resolve disputes, that is not their only task.91 The courts are 
considered to be in charge of dispensing justice and taking into account the values of the civil 
justice system when issuing a judgment. With collective ADR, whether an adjudicative ADR 
entity issues a decision or the parties reach a mutually pleasing compromise, such outcomes 
could be viewed as being far from achieving justice due to the lack of a public dimension. In 
line with this limiting view, ADR entities are seen as mere rent-a-judge entities that are 
                                                            
90 Menkel-Meadow 1995 (n 9), p. 2665. 
91 S. Roberts & M. Palmer, Dispute Processes: ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision-Making (Cambridge 
University Press 2005), p. 221. 
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considered suitable to deal with issues of fact, but not with issues of law.92 Consequently, in 
sensitive areas that touch upon critical societal values, proponents of this view would argue 
that it is more important to have justice through courts than to have peace through ADR.93 In 
essence, these criticisms imply that collective ADR is exclusively based on private interests 
(often only the individual interests of the stronger party) and ultimately void of values that 
only a public dimension could provide. This argument is likely to constitute an 
oversimplification that places such private processes into a legal and societal vacuum. 
Proponents of ADR submit that consensual dispute resolution mechanisms are based on 
several values that correspond to those promoted by the civil justice system; such as 
participation, harmony, respect, empathy, consensus, privacy, community and equity.94 While 
the courts receive their legitimacy from their connection to the state, collective ADR 
procedures are legitimized by the consent of the individual parties. Some even view ADR as a 
social movement or a value system, which can act as a democratic assertion of individual 
justice or as an ideology that introduces a new dimension to civil justice.95 Moreover, the 
advancement of private interests with ADR does not exclude the parallel advancement of 
public interests, which can occur through increased deterrence. The criticisms addressed 
above also disregard the broader processes of formalisation and informalisation that 
increasingly blur the line between public and private. The informalisation is evidenced by the 
development and widespread acceptance of ADR mechanisms, the inclusion of ADR in court 
proceedings and tasking the judges with case settlement objectives; whereas formalisation 
constitutes the increased regulation and juridification of ADR mechanisms, through which 
informal ADR processes are integrated into a formal framework to meet due process 
requirements and obtain court-like qualities. 96 
 
The extent to which the concerns about the loss of a ‘public dimension’ are relevant when 
discussing the private enforcement of competition law, can vary. It will be argued that 
criticisms of such nature have a limited impact in the scenarios that involve the use of 
collective ADR under the architecture envisioned in this thesis, for the following reasons: 
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96 Palmer 2014 (n 95), p. 23, 42-44. 
  37 
(1) It should be considered that using collective ADR - a voluntary device - is likely to occur 
predominantly in the course of on-going public investigations or as a follow-on claim after 
the infringement decision. The follow-on nature of the claims will effectively mitigate several 
concerns. It is less likely that undertakings would voluntarily agree to take proactive 
compensatory action in stand-alone claims without the existence of any investigations or 
infringement decisions, unless the substantive and procedural rules of a legal system are 
sufficiently favourable to materialize a serious threat of stand-alone collective litigation.   
 
(2) The use of collective ADR would occur directly in the ‘shadow of the law and the 
courthouse’, meaning the dispute would be assessed in reference to the rules of competition 
law, tort law and civil procedure, as well as considering the infringement decision, the 
likelihood of impending private damages litigation and its possible outcome. The consensual 
resolution of the dispute would therefore not be unprincipled or detached from the law, as the 
critics of ADR often fear; it would be directly dependant on the relevant legal variables. 
Consequently, if there is uncertainty about the content or application of the relevant rules, 
then it is likely to be reflected in the collective ADR process. 
 
(3) The precedential and educational value of claims, which would be lost if collective ADR 
were to be used instead of litigation, should not be overstated. From the perspective of 
clarifying substantive competition law, follow-on claims could essentially be deemed 
useless.97 The potential contribution of such claims would be limited to clarifying procedural 
tort elements, such as establishing harm and causation. The contribution of stand-alone claims 
would be more significant, however, the proposed addition of collective ADR as first choice 
would never exclude the use of litigation. This means that the less straightforward cases that 
contain procedurally or substantively uncertain claims are less likely to be settled voluntarily 
through ADR to begin with and would be presented in courts, where the law could be 
clarified. Furthermore, such legal issues could equally be clarified through legislative action 
or mass torts from other disciplines. 
 
(4) Finally, not all disputes trigger the need for the public and judicial clarification of laws 
and societal values. The development of collective ADR should not be hindered by simply 
classifying all mass torts as requiring public oversight in the form of litigation due to the 
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amount of parties involved. With follow-on actions in particular, concerns regarding the 
‘public interest’ and the ‘need for the avoidance of abuse’ have largely been taken into 
account already when the initial decision by the public authority was rendered.98 
 
In sum, the scenarios that involve the use of collective ADR under the regulatory enforcement 
architecture envisioned in this thesis, do not pose serious concerns that negate the use of 
private dispute resolution mechanisms. However, collective ADR is not without its 
challenges, which nevertheless warrants the development of public oversight. 
 
Consenting to collective ADR 
 
The key concern with collective ADR is not its non-judicial and private nature, but the 
existence of genuine consent to the proceedings and to its binding outcome. As a starting 
point, it is clear that any inequalities of power that would exist with collective litigation 
would also exist with collective ADR. The infringing undertakings would continue to possess 
economic and information advantages in informal processes. It is also true that the 
confidentiality of the proceedings combined with the relaxation of procedural requirements 
would not always work in the favour of the weaker party.99 The basic rhetoric of consensus 
assumes a level of equality between the parties, often envisioning ‘a quarrel between two 
neighbours’, which could be best solved by coming to a ‘compromise.’100 This idealized 
vision of private autonomy does not represent diffuse large-scale low-value damages, which is 
why an aggregation of private claims would be necessary to balance the scales. However, 
since consent can be considered a cornerstone of ADR, it would be important to determine 
whether genuine consent can be retained with collective ADR if several non-participating 
victims are involved. Post-dispute multi-party proceedings that only cover the participating 
parties and result in a binding agreement are not per se problematic or likely to encounter 
significant difficulties with the recognition and enforcement of the outcome. Yet, the 
attraction of collective proceedings in mass harm situations lies in its ability to deliver once-
and-for-all solutions with broad coverage of the relevant victims. Achieving such outcomes 
could necessitate the use of an opt-out model, whereby the outcome would be made binding 
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on victims that never explicitly agreed to be included in the proceedings. If an opt-out 
application is considered to be problematic even in the context of litigation, then it would 
require even more careful scrutiny in the context of ADR. Furthermore, introducing collective 
ADR could produce additional consent-related scenarios that need to be considered. For 
instance, it makes a difference whether the agreement to engage in collective ADR occurs 
before or after the dispute has arisen. Moreover, in case the victims include consumers, 
concerns can arise regarding their ability to consent to the proceedings in the first place, given 
the inequalities of power with the infringing undertakings. These concerns have a direct 
impact on determining the level of public oversight that would be required to ensure due 
process and fairness guarantees. The following analysis will feature a mix of positive and 
normative evaluations by first outlining the state of play in the EU and then assessing its 
implications for the regulatory enforcement architecture. 
 
No consent - The most straightforward problem with consent would arise if it were to be 
eliminated altogether by making the ADR proceedings mandatory by law. With consumers as 
victims, the Court of Justice established in Alassini that making ADR proceedings mandatory 
would not violate the consumer’s right to effective judicial protection, as long as it does not 
force the consumer to be bound by the outcome and create disproportionate costs or delay.101 
Therefore, the key problem lies with the finality of the ADR proceedings, meaning that 
mandatory ADR that results in a binding outcome (i.e. arbitration) would be prohibited. 
However, non-binding forms of ADR would be allowed because if the parties fail to come to a 
consensual agreement, then they could always resort to litigation. Thus, in B2C situations, 
Member States have the discretion to make non-binding forms of ADR mandatory. In B2B 
situations, businesses are subject to different treatment under national laws and are unlikely to 
enjoy similar protections. In any case, the mandatory nature of collective ADR proceedings 
has not yet been explicitly addressed, but the complexities of mass harm are likely to trigger 
more careful consideration under national laws. Even so, the utility of making non-binding 
collective ADR mandatory would be rather low in the first place, since it would not lead to 
the certainty of once-and-for-all outcomes if the victims could choose not to be bound by the 
outcome after all. Ultimately, the aim of the regulatory enforcement architecture is to create 
different avenues for private enforcement and promote collective ADR as the first choice 
through facilitation and inducements, not on a mandatory basis.  
 
                                                            
101 Joined cases C-317/08-C-320/08 Alassini and others v Telecom Italia [2010] ECR I-2213. 
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Pre-dispute consent - Additional problems with consent can arise in case the infringing 
undertakings and their victims have concluded a pre-dispute agreement that stipulates the use 
of ADR for subsequent disputes related to or arising from the contract. Although many 
victims will not have any contractual connection to the infringing undertakings, it is likely 
that some of the potential parties to the collective proceedings will. Such an agreement can 
take the form of a standardized clause in a contract, which would generally be accepted by the 
victim due to their lack of knowledge or bargaining power. Again, the key problem regards 
the validity of pre-dispute consent in case of binding ADR proceedings. In B2C situations, the 
Unfair Terms Directive would render such clauses that have not been individually negotiated 
as unfair in case they ‘exclude or hinder the consumer’s right to take legal action.’102 Member 
States have interpreted the consequences of the unfairness differently - either by making the 
clauses automatically void or simply avoidable under certain conditions - but most pre-
dispute binding ADR clauses with consumers would be prohibited.103 In B2B situations, 
businesses are subject to different treatment under national laws and are unlikely to enjoy 
similar protections. However, some Member States are also considering the adoption of 
consumer-like unfair terms protections for SME-s. 104  Again, the pre-dispute consent to 
collective ADR proceedings has not been explicitly addressed yet, but the limitations with 
consumers would apply in any case and weaken the desirability of the mechanism for the 
infringers. Some Member States have introduced special rules for opt-in multi-party 
arbitration, e.g. consumer arbitration in Spain and shareholder arbitration in Germany.105 The 
particular finality of pre-dispute arbitration clauses that aim to bind victims in an opt-out 
manner warrants further analysis. The US ‘class arbitration’ experience can prove to be an 
illuminating case study and will be discussed further below. 
 
Post-dispute explicit consent - Obtaining the post-dispute consent of every victim in an 
explicit manner is the least problematic scenario. Ideally, all relevant victims would be 
sufficiently informed and join collective ADR proceedings voluntarily after the infringement 
has taken place, which would amount to an opt-in model. As discussed in chapter 1, an opt-in 
model was considered the most ‘European’ and politically acceptable approach throughout the 
collective redress policy developments. However, despite the obvious merits of an explicit 
                                                            
102 Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, Art. 3 (1) & Annex (q). 
103 I. Bantekas, An Introduction to International Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 2015), p. 259-260. 
104 UK Department for Business Innovation & Skill, ‘Protection of Small Businesses When Purchasing Goods 
and Services: Call for Evidence’, March 2015. 
105 S.I. Strong, Class, Mass, and Collective Arbitration in National and International Law (Oxford University 
Press 2013), p. 19-20. 
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consent model, it must be reconciled with the reality that the participation rates with opt-in 
proceedings are very low in case of low-value damages due to economic, procedural, social 
and cognitive reasons.106 Moreover, the limited coverage of victims would undermine the 
attractiveness collective ADR for the infringing undertakings and therefore be unlikely to 
solve the private enforcement gap. Although the choice regarding the extent of collective 
ADR’s coverage is ultimately up to the parties to decide, an opt-in model would not serve as 
the most potent utilisation of the device. 
 
Post-dispute implicit consent - Obtaining the post-dispute consent of non-participating 
victims in an implicit manner by including them in the proceedings unless they explicitly opt 
out, is more problematic from an individualistic procedural justice perspective. However, as 
discussed above, an opt-out is model capable of producing superior participation rates and is 
ultimately necessary to ensure the effective private enforcement of low-value damages. The 
individual due process and fairness concerns could be mitigated by a fairness review, which 
will be addressed later in this section. Ultimately, an opt-out model in combination with 
adequate safeguards should be facilitated to secure compensation for as many victims as 
possible and to increase the attractiveness of voluntary compensation for the infringing 
undertakings. The ‘facilitation’ of an opt-out model within the architecture means providing 
the possibility to receive approval and recognition of the opt-out coverage during the fairness 
review and for its subsequent cross-border enforcement. 
 
Case study: class arbitration  
 
A special category of collective ADR could illustrate an additional consent-centred dynamic. 
The preceding discussions have primarily focused on obtaining the consent of the victims, 
with the assumption that the infringers would be interested in collective ADR as a result of 
the incentives provided by the architecture. However, the infringers could also use arbitral 
clauses (or other contractual ADR agreements) in an abusive way to limit their exposure to 
collective proceedings. As a starting point, the characteristics of arbitration prescribe that 
every potential participant of collective arbitration must have an arbitral agreement with the 
infringing undertakings. If the victims do not have an arbitral agreement with the infringing 
                                                            
106 Discussed in chapter 2 regarding the incentives for victims and their representatives; for further analysis, see 
Mulheron 2008 (n 24).  
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undertakings, then it will not be possible to use arbitration in any manner.107 If the victims do 
have an individual arbitral agreement, then it would be possible to join their claims for 
collective arbitration. The joinder might involve a preliminary certification phase whereby the 
arbitral tribunal determines the suitability of the relevant victims.108 If the joinder occurs on 
an opt-in basis, then it would simply be a multi-party form of arbitration, which does not raise 
concerns per se. However, if the joinder occurs on an opt-out basis, then a similar set of 
concerns that were discussed in the previous paragraph would arise. Opt-out collective 
arbitration is commonly referred to as ‘class arbitration’ due to its US origin. In particular, the 
US experience has highlighted three scenarios of consenting to class arbitration:109  
 
(1) The agreement explicitly prescribes class arbitration - Although rare in practice, when 
given the right incentives, class arbitration would ideally be used in this manner. In the US, 
the existence of such an arbitration agreement would allow to bind non-participating parties 
on an opt-out basis. The EU does not yet feature class arbitration regimes. 
 
(2) The agreement is silent on class arbitration - The US Supreme Court dealt with silence on 
two occasions. Initially, in Green Tree v Bazzle (2003) the possibility of class arbitration in 
case of silence was left for the arbitral tribunal to decide. 110  This would have been in 
accordance with the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle that allows arbitrators to assess their 
own competence to arbitrate. However, the situation changed with Stolt-Nielsen (2010), 
which established that ‘arbitration is fundamentally based on consent’ and silence could 
therefore not constitute an acceptance of class arbitration.111 It is likely that a similar position 
would be adopted in most Member States, given the lack of class arbitration regulation and 
the importance of consent in regular arbitral proceedings. In case the infringer is not 
cooperative, this would work against the victims and prevent them from joining their claims. 
If silence were to be interpreted as implicit consent, then questions could arise about whether 
the ‘nature of arbitration’ is affected. An affirmative interpretation would be more victim-
                                                            
107  It could be possible to convert a settlement into an arbitral award, but not in case the settlement included 
victims without pre-existing arbitral agreements on an opt-out basis; S.I. Strong, ‘From Class to Collective: The 
De-Americanization of Class Arbitration’ (2010) Arbitration International Vol. 26(4), 493, p. 506. 
108 American Arbitration Association, ‘Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration’ (AAA 2003) and Judicial 
Arbitration and Mediation Services, ‘Class Action Procedures’ (JAMS 2009) are most frequently used as 
specialized guidance; Strong 2013 (n 105), p. 44. 
109 P. Billiet (ed), Class Arbitration in the European Union (Maklu 2013), p. 12; Strong 2013 (n 105), p. 171-
172. 
110 Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
111 Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
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friendly, especially since the unexpected class arbitration could have easily been avoided by 
the infringing undertakings by drafting more explicit arbitral clauses. 
 
(3) The agreement explicitly prohibits class arbitration with a class waiver - Such waivers 
compel the victim to individual arbitration and explicitly exclude class arbitration. Following 
AT&T v Concepcion (2011), waivers were found to be ‘conscionable’ and thereby permitted 
even in standardised contracts with consumers.112 In the antitrust case American Express v 
Italian Colors Restaurant (2013), waivers were not found to impede the right to ‘effective 
vindication’ even if resorting to individual arbitration would make it too expensive for any 
action to be taken at all. 113 Allowing undertakings to effectively eliminate any threat of 
collective proceedings - both ADR and litigation - through individual arbitration clauses, is 
very concerning and likely to magnify existing inequalities of power. In this regard, the US 
experience can serve as an example of the choices to avoid. Considering the high level of 
consumer protection in the EU, pre-dispute non-negotiated class waivers that exclude 
litigation would be prohibited. However, with businesses as victims, the situation would vary 
per Member State.  
 
In sum, the existence of genuine consent to collective ADR is a multi-layered issue that 
requires an assessment of all consent-related scenarios that could emerge. As collective ADR 
has not yet been regulated on the EU level, there are many gaps in the law. To date, the EU 
has introduced minimum safeguards that protect consumers from certain abuses, but in case 
the victims are businesses, their protection would be subject to different treatment in the 
Member States. Ultimately, particular attention must be paid to an opt-out application of 
collective ADR, whereby many non-participating victims would be included on the basis of 
implicit consent. 
 
3.2 Balancing incentives and safeguards 
 
As evidenced by the preceding discussions, collective ADR is exposed to certain risks and 
tradeoffs, especially in its most potent opt-out form. This warrants the development of public 
oversight in order to ensure due process and fairness guarantees. It is imperative, however, to 
develop a balanced approach towards regulating collective ADR’s weaknesses as not to 
                                                            
112 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
113 American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. ___ (2013). 
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diminish its strengths. In particular, as a private dispute resolution mechanism, collective 
ADR should not receive the exact same treatment as collective litigation. While some 
tradeoffs are inevitable with any form of collective proceedings, it will be argued that the key 
concerns with collective ADR can be mitigated by the architecture. The following sections 
will first dissect the different ‘outcomes’ that collective ADR proceedings can produce and 
then suggest how the fairness concerns could be addressed. 
 
Once-and-for-all: recognition and enforcement  
 
Voluntary engagement in collective ADR would not be as desirable for the undertakings if 
they were uncertainties about the cross-border recognition and enforcement of the outcome of 
the proceedings. Achieving ‘once-and-for-all’ solutions that cover as many victims as 
possible, has been highlighted as one of the most desirable features of collective ADR.114 
Unfortunately, the recognition and enforcement of collective ADR outcomes remains a 
problematic issue, since in some contexts their res judicata effect is not viewed as a benefit, 
but as a risk. Since the EU is still relatively unfamiliar with collective ADR, the situation is 
worsened by the presence of gaps in the private international law regime. For a streamlined 
analysis, a distinction will be made between the different possible outcomes of collective 
ADR proceedings.  
 
ADR entity decisions - The decisions issued by ADR entities are accepted as binding on the 
basis of a contractual agreement between the parties. In order to bind victims in an opt-out 
manner, court approval would be needed to secure sufficient legal certainty. While this is a 
common route for negotiated mass settlements, ADR entities have barely any experience in 
this regard. Generally, compliance with ADR entity decisions is only ensured within national 
borders with specific enforcement measures in the national laws.115 Adding the requirement of 
judicial approval for every decision is likely to undermine the autonomy, functioning and 
attraction of ADR entities, unless their role is reduced to settlement facilitators. 
                                                            
114 See the Damages Directive (n 2), Recital 48: “Achieving a ‘once-and-for-all’ settlement for defendants is 
desirable in order to reduce uncertainty for infringers and injured parties. Therefore, infringers and injured 
parties should be encouraged to agree on compensating for the harm caused by a competition law infringement 
through consensual dispute resolution mechanisms, such as out-of-court settlements (including those where a 
judge can declare a settlement binding), arbitration, mediation or conciliation. Such consensual dispute 
resolution should cover as many injured parties and infringers as legally possible. The provisions in this 
Directive on consensual dispute resolution are therefore meant to facilitate the use of such mechanisms and 
increase their effectiveness.” [emphasis added] 
115 For an overview on the coverage of consumer ADR entities in Europe, see C. Hodges, I. Benöhr & N. 
Creutzfeldt-Banda (eds), Consumer ADR in Europe (Hart Publishing 2012), p. 392. 
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Settlements - As with the decisions of ADR entities, settlements are accepted as binding on 
the basis of a contractual agreement between the parties and in order to bind victims in an opt-
out manner, court approval would have to be secured. The Brussels I Regulation Recast 
clarified the status of settlements in Art. 2 (b), which declared both litigation settlements and 
out-of-court settlements that received court approval, as ‘court settlements.’ Therefore, the 
court that approves such settlements needs to assert jurisdiction in accordance with Brussels I 
and if the settlement is successfully approved, Art. 58-59 stipulate that it must be enforced in 
all Member States. The only exception arises in case the settlement would be manifestly 
contrary to public policy. Public policy concerns can arise with settlements that cover opt-out 
victims due to a lack explicit consent. The requirements regarding the consent of such victims 
have not been clarified in the Brussels I Regulation or by the Court of Justice. In this regard, 
the Court has referred to the choice of forum provision (Art. 25) of Brussels I, which can be 
satisfied with implicit consent.116 However, the question of whether ‘not using the opportunity 
to opt-out’ is considered as implicit consent has not been clarified and Member States can 
develop different approaches, which is capable of threatening the effectiveness of opt-out 
settlements. The boldest cross-border opt-out jurisdiction assertions occur in the Netherlands 
and will be assessed further in chapter 4. 
 
Arbitral awards - Arbitration is excluded from the scope of the Brussels I Regulation by Art. 2 
(d) as the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is governed by the New York 
Convention. Multifaceted competition damages claims would be covered due to the broad 
interpretation of ‘commercial disputes’.117 However, the intricacies of collective arbitration, 
especially opt-out class arbitration, are largely ungoverned by the existing regime. 
Nevertheless, Art. V of the Convention includes several grounds for refusal, which could 
become relevant for class arbitration. Firstly, if the applicable law does not allow for class 
arbitration, then the underlying arbitral agreement could be deemed invalid.118 Secondly, the 
agreement could also be invalid if the subject matter is not considered arbitrable in that state. 
This could occur in case the arbitral award attempts to bind EU consumers in a mandatory 
                                                            
116 A. Stadler, ‘Mass Damages in Europe – Allocation of Jurisdiction – Cross-border Multidistrict Litigation’ in 
W.H. van Boom & G. Wagner (eds), Mass Torts in Europe: Cases and Reflections (Walter de Gruyter 2014), p. 
214. 
117 Strong 2010 (n 107), p. 524-525. 
118 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), Art. V 
(1)(d). 
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manner.119 Thirdly, if the class arbitration proceeding did not include sufficient due process 
for the non-participating parties, such as notification and an opportunity to participate, then 
the award could be refused.120 The sufficiency of the procedural safeguards will generally be 
interpreted in accordance with the law of the seat.121 Fourthly, the award could be refused if 
the opt-out models would breach the public policy of the enforcement state.122 However, the 
relevant standard is that of ‘international public policy’, which requires serious substantive or 
procedural concerns and is rarely a successful refusal basis in practice.123 All in all, these 
grounds for refusal are capable of threatening the effectiveness of class arbitration. 
 
In sum, the cross-border recognition and enforcement of ADR outcomes that attempt to bind 
non-participating victims in an opt-out manner, is a problematic issue regardless of the type of 
collective ADR procedure chosen. Regardless of the opting model used, if the aim of the EU’s 
private international law regime is facilitate collective proceedings, then the existing 
legislation could benefit from numerous procedural clarifications.124 Although this thesis will 
not go into depth about the possible private international law reform proposals in this context, 
it is acknowledged that improving the enforcement regime is imperative for the effective 
functioning of the regulatory enforcement architecture and could be achieved by introducing 
special provisions on collective redress in the Brussels I Regulation. The following sub-
section will delve further into mitigating the issues that underpin the resistance to collective 
ADR’s finality and broad coverage. 
 
Fairness review 
 
Collective proceedings with non-participating parties produce specific tensions that must be 
addressed by the legal system in which it operates or by the system to which it is submitted 
for recognition and enforcement. As a normative starting point, the elements that require 
balancing are not the traditional principles of procedural justice and the efficiencies of 
collective ADR, but rather, two different notions of procedural justice. A distinction could be 
made between the ‘individual fairness’ of binding victims out-of-court with representatives, 
especially in an opt-out manner, and the ‘collective fairness’ that includes the victims, 
                                                            
119 New York Convention (n 118), Art. V (2)(a). 
120 New York Convention (n 118), Art. V (1)(b). 
121 Z.S. Tang, Electronic Consumer Contracts in The Conflict of Laws (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2015), p. 327. 
122 New York Convention (n 118), Art. V (2)(b). 
123 Billiet 2013 (n 109), p. 27; Strong 2010 (n 107), p. 541-547. 
124 Stadler 2014 (n 116), p. 201. 
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infringers and the society as a whole. Collective fairness encompasses the access to justice 
gains achieved for victims that would not have been compensated otherwise, the public 
benefits of deterrence, the removal of illicit gains,125 the promotion of consensual dispute 
resolution and the once-and-for-all coverage benefits for the infringers. Collective fairness is 
greater than the sum of its individual fairness parts.126 Put differently, using collective ADR 
with large-scale low-value claims produces positive externalities that go beyond the 
vindication of separate or joined individual rights. Instead of resorting to per se unfairness on 
the basis of individualistic procedural justice, the broader implications of collective ADR 
should be scrutinized while taking into account the relevant regulatory objectives and the 
limitations of the existing enforcement frameworks. This balancing exercise adopts a broader 
approach to access to justice, which is not limited to legal formalism and a single goal of 
individual compensation. 127  Access to justice requires a contextual understanding of the 
needs, solutions and impacts of the legal response, which takes into account the cultural, 
economic and psychological realities of individual and organizational behaviour. 128 
Ultimately, collective ADR provides more than just procedural efficiencies; it can advance 
notions of collective fairness for all affected parties. 
 
While some tradeoffs between individual and collective fairness are inevitable with any form 
of collective proceedings, it is submitted that the the key access to justice concerns with 
collective ADR can be mitigated by a fairness review. In order to preserve the autonomous 
character of out-of-court collective ADR, the review and approval of the outcome should take 
place after the proceedings have concluded. For stand-alone and follow-on claims, the review 
can take place during the enforcement stage by the courts; for the follow-on claims that are 
settled in the framework of ongoing investigations, the review could take place concurrently 
with the public investigation and involve the public enforcer as a reviewer. In the latter 
scenario, the involvement of neutral third party reviewers could be envisioned.129 Additional 
court entanglement at an earlier stage would not only threaten the procedural efficiencies of 
collective ADR, but also undermine the internalization of the due process and fairness 
                                                            
125 R. Fentiman, ‘Recognition, Enforcement and Collective Judgments’ in A. Nuyts & N.E. Hatzimihail (eds), 
Cross-Border Class Actions: The European Way (Sellier European Law Publishers 2014), p. 107. 
126 M. Shapiro, ‘Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client’ (1998) Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 73(4), 913, 
p. 933; Ioannidou 2015 (n 4), p. 112.  
127 Ioannidou 2015 (n 4), p. 115-117. 
128 M. Cappelletti, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes Within the Framework of the World Wide Access 
to Justice Movement’ (1993) Modern Law Review Vol. 56(3), 282, p. 283. 
129 For instance, the ‘voluntary redress schemes’ under the UK architecture assign a significant review role for 
independent experts, as will be discussed later in the thesis.  
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requirements in the dispute resolution process. 130  An ex post fairness review would put 
pressure on the parties and, if applicable, on the relevant ADR entities, to meet these 
requirements in a way that best accommodates the consensual nature of the process. In other 
words, with ex post fairness review, the parties would have to work harder to present a 
wholesome package that gives due regard to collective interests, whereas with ex ante 
preliminary review, they would be partly relieved of this task by the court-determined class 
certification. The following non-comprehensive benchmarks are a compilation of common 
elements found in several collective litigation models and, depending on how they would be 
applied in the national systems, have the capacity to represent a fair balance for the ex post 
fairness review. 
 
(1) Compensation - The review should not determine whether an even better outcome could 
be reached, but whether the outcome that has been agreed upon is adequate.131 It should 
identify unequivocal signs of unfairness, conflicts of interest and a lack of reasoned 
explanations with regards to the compensation amount agreed upon.132 In particular, the 
fairness of the compensation allocation between different categories of victims (i.e. direct and 
indirect purchasers) and the compensation for the representative entity should be reviewed. It 
should also consider that a negotiated outcome would offer the certainty of obtaining actual 
compensation, which might not be the case with litigation in case the infringer were to 
become insolvent. Moreover, the broadness of the coverage (i.e. choosing to include indirect 
purchasers) could have warranted compromises in other aspects. All in all, a reasonable 
review of the compensation achieved is warranted due to the existence of a large number of 
non-participating parties to collective agreements. 
 
(2) Notification and participation - The notice should provide minimum substantive and 
procedural information about the dispute and the chosen dispute resolution procedure, the 
parties involved, the representatives, the binding nature of the outcome and any possibilities 
for direct participation. The victims that intend to opt-in or opt-out would have to receive 
guidance as to the reasonable steps that they would have to take for that end. In case 
confidentiality is insisted upon, the notice should specify the terms under which the recipient 
                                                            
130 C.J. Buckner, ‘Due Process in Class Arbitration’ (2006) Florida Law Review Vol. 58, 185, p. 238. 
131 E.g. the US class action and class arbitration rules prescribe a ‘fair, reasonable and adequate’ standard, 
although exact state-level interpretations diverge; see Federal Rules of Procedure Rule 23(e), AAA Rule 8, 
JAMS Rule 6(a)(2); Buckner 2006 (n 130), p. 200.  
132 J.R. Macey & G.P. Miller, ‘Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements’ (2009) Journal of Legal Analysis 
Vol. 1(1), 167, p. 183-185. 
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may discuss the matters relating to the dispute. The specific manner in which the notification 
requirement could be satisfied, can be left for the Member States to decide, but a ‘reasonable’ 
standard would be advisable in case the identification of victims is problematic.133  
 
(3) Representation - The review should primarily identify any conflicts of interest between the 
representative entity and the victims. The exact standards can be left for the Member States to 
determine, especially in case they deem additional protections to be necessary for the opt-out 
application. For instance, conflicts would be unlikely to emerge in case the entity is dedicated 
to the protection of certain categories of victims, like consumers. The funding of 
representative entities should be addressed under the general review of the compensatory 
outcome. 
 
(4) Plans for unclaimed compensation - Leftover funds are likely to occur with any low-value 
claims due to the low motivation for taking action.134 This would be the case regardless of 
whether an opt-in or opt-out model was used, although they are more likely with the latter. In 
such cases, the development of cy-près solutions should be encouraged, especially if the 
identification of victims and the distribution of compensation would be problematic.135 Cy-
près would put the unclaimed funds in their ‘next best use’, for example by investing in a 
victim- or infringement-related cause. In choosing the best cy-près outlet, emphasis should be 
placed on contributing to the relevant collective interest, especially in order to justify an opt-
out application. If a common collective interest is difficult to identify, then investing in access 
to justice funds for future low-value claims could be considered. Simply reverting the 
unclaimed compensation back to the infringing undertaking would be less likely to serve such 
interests, unless it is coupled with a comprehensive compliance-oriented proposal. The 
responsive and flexible nature of cy-près makes it a good fit for the regulatory enforcement 
architecture. 
 
Even with these benchmarks in mind, assessing the fairness of collective ADR outcomes 
could undoubtedly be challenging for the reviewer, especially considering the presentation of 
                                                            
133 E.g. the US class action and class arbitration rules prescribe ‘reasonable efforts’ for developing the ‘best 
notice practicable under the circumstances’; see Federal Rules of Procedure Rule 23(c)(2)(b), AAA Rule 6(a), 
JAMS Rule 4. 
134 As discussed above in relation to opt-in and opt-out models; for further analysis, see Mulheron 2008 (n 24). 
135  R. Mulheron, ‘Cy-Près Damages Distributions in England: A New Era for Consumer Redress’ (2009) 
European Business Law Review Vol. 20(2), 307, p. 329-331. 
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a non-adversarial ‘unified front’ and the difficulty of reaching a consensual solution.136 With 
competition damages in particular, there could be contention regarding the distribution of 
compensation between the different categories of victims and the approximations of harm 
underlying the compensatory amounts. However, the fairness review ultimately provides the 
opportunity to balance all of these considerations, while giving due regard to the advanced 
stage of the dispute resolution process. In sum, in order to ensure the effective and efficient 
functioning of collective ADR, the regulatory enforcement architecture needs to include 
reasonable fairness safeguards for non-participating victims and an adequate private 
international law regime for securing sufficient finality. 
 
  
                                                            
136 For a discussion on the challenges of approving cartel damages settlements in Canada, see R. Mulheron, 'A 
Spotlight on the Settlement Criteria Under the United Kingdom's New Competition Class Action' (2016) Civil 
Justice Quarterly Vol. 35(1), 14, p. 23-27. 
  51 
Chapter 4: A comparative analysis of collective ADR in the Netherlands and the UK 
 
A comparative analysis could illustrate how collective ADR works in practice and point 
towards important considerations for the development of a European collective ADR model. 
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom were chosen as the subjects of the comparative 
study since, unlike most Member States, they both feature a national regulatory enforcement 
architecture that integrates collective ADR. In order to develop a better understanding of 
collective ADR as a tool of private enforcement, this chapter will be divided into two parts. 
The first part provides a detailed overview of both national architectures, including an 
assessment of the toolbox of collective redress proceedings that are available, as well as 
insights into the capacities of the public enforcer to affect the provision of voluntary 
compensation. Building on that information, the second part develops a comparative analysis 
focusing on the key issues that determine the functioning and potential success of a collective 
ADR model within both national systems.  
 
4.1 The Netherlands 
 
4.1.1 Toolbox of collective proceedings 
 
The Netherlands does not have a competition-specific private enforcement regime featuring 
collective ADR. However, the collective devices within the existing cross-sectoral regime 
would also be applicable to competition damages claims. In particular, this section will 
provide an overview of two devices: (1) opt-out collective litigation, and (2) opt-out collective 
settlements. Next to these devices, the Netherlands features different collective joinder 
procedures that bundle individually brought claims. Although they will not be included in this 
section, these procedures bear a mention, since they have been used to obtain competition 
damages.137 However, in case of large-scale low-value claims, the existence of the joinder 
device would not create significant incentives for the voluntary initiation of collective ADR, 
since the victims are unlikely to bring individual claims in the first place. 
 
                                                            
137 J.S. Kortmann & M.C. Buiten, ‘Private Enforcement and Collective Redress in European Competition Law’ 
(2015) FIDE 2016 Questionnaire, p. 20. For example, special purpose vehicles were created by the Cartel 
Damages Claims group for the candle wax cartel, by the East-West Debt group for the elevator and escalator 
cartels, and by several groups for the air cargo cartel.  
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Collective litigation 
 
Less known than its settlement counterpart, the Netherlands has featured an opt-out collective 
litigation device since 1994, housed in Art. 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code. However, it is of 
limited use for compensation claims as the collective proceeding can result in every remedy 
except for compensatory damages. 138  The claims can only be brought by non-profit 
representative entities that have a clear connection to the collective interest of the victims they 
represent (i.e. in their articles of association). Despite lacking a compensatory remedy, 
representative entities have sought injunctions and declaratory judgments with the aim of 
setting the scene for subsequent individual claims. For instance, the biggest consumer 
association in the Netherlands, the Consumer Union (Consumentenbond), has successfully 
achieved declaratory judgments that resulted in follow-on damages claims.139 The device 
could also be used to induce settlements, since collective ADR is promoted as a pre-litigation 
step in Art. 3:305a(2), which stipulates that the representative entity could only have a right to 
action if their attempts at negotiation with the defendant were not successful. However, due to 
the lack of a compensatory remedy and the difficulty of bringing individual follow-on claims, 
the collective litigation device is ultimately unable to create any significant incentives for the 
voluntary initiation of collective ADR for victims of large-scale low-value damage. In 2014, 
the Dutch Minister of Security and Justice devised a preliminary draft bill with amendments 
that would remove the prohibition on compensatory damages.140 The draft was accompanied 
by a public consultation, but no legislative action has been taken yet. 
 
Collective settlements 
 
The Netherlands also features an opt-out collective settlement device that was meant to fill the 
compensation gap left by collective litigation. The Dutch Act on the Collective Settlement of 
Mass Damage Claims (Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade, WCAM) was created in 
order to facilitate consensual settlements and grant them binding effect on the relevant victims 
affected by the infringement in an opt-out manner. The WCAM entered into force through 
amendments to the Civil Code (Art. 7:907-7:910) and Code of Civil Procedure (Art. 1013-
                                                            
138 It covers injunctions, declaratory judgments, performance of a contractual duty, termination or rescission of 
contract. 
139 F. Weber, The Law and Economics of Enforcing European Consumer Law: a Comparative Analysis of 
Package Travel and Misleading Advertising (Ashgate Publishing 2014), p. 169. 
140 Dutch Minister of Security and Justice, ‘Dutch Draft Bill on Redress of Mass Damages in a Collective 
Action’, 7 July 2014. 
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1018) in July 2005, and has subsequently been amended. Since its introduction, the WCAM 
has been used to reach a number of successful settlements,141 however, it has not yet been 
used for a competition damages claim. It has proven to be an attractive device for 
international settlements due to its unique features and bold jurisdictional application that 
facilitates the broadest possible victim coverage. According to interviews with stakeholders 
from some of the aforementioned settlements, the initiative to start the WCAM procedure 
originated from the infringing undertakings.142 To balance its incentivizing application, the 
WCAM includes several fairness safeguards encompassed in the judicial review, notification 
requirements and eligibility conditions for representative entities. 
 
In order to negotiate a settlement on behalf of the victims, one or more representative entities 
need to be established. The representatives can be foundations or associations that are 
connected to the collective interests of the victims.143 Moreover, the Consumer Authority can 
represent victims that are consumers, 144  but it has not made use of its powers yet. 145 
Following the 2013 merger between the Consumer and Competition Authorities, it remains to 
be seen whether the merger will impact the private enforcement of competition law in case 
the victims include consumers. As for the private representatives, a Dutch ‘foundation’ is 
relatively easy and inexpensive to create, and can serve the ad hoc purpose of representing the 
victims in the WCAM procedure. An ‘association’ is a more controlled entity that has 
members and additional objectives. Both representative entities must be non-profit, but 
receiving third party funding is allowed and the WCAM is silent on the legal counsel’s fees, 
which generates some financial incentives. Interestingly, in the Converium settlement, the 
court took ‘customary US fee practices’ as a reference point when approving a 20% fee for 
the US-based legal counsel, which was considered to be excessive and contrary to Dutch 
                                                            
141 The WCAM has produced the 2006 DES settlement on prenatal pharmaceutical drugs, the 2007 Dexia 
settlement on the failure to warn about the risks of securities lease products, the 2009 Vie d’Or settlement on the 
bankruptcy of an insurance company, the 2009 Shell settlement on misleading statements concerning their oil 
and gas reserves, the 2009 Vedior settlement on insider trading, the 2011 Converium settlement on false 
statements about the company’s financial position, the 2014 DES II second settlement and the 2014 DSB Bank 
settlement on the violation of a duty of care by a bankrupt bank. In 2016, negotiations were initiated in order to 
reach a Volkswagen settlement for losses related to their emissions testing fraud, covering securities publicly 
traded outside of the US; see Volkswagen Investor Settlement Foundation 2016. 
142 I. Tzankova & D. Hensler, ‘Collective Settlements in the Netherlands: Some Empirical Observations’ in C. 
Hodges & A. Stadler (eds), Resolving Mass Disputes: ADR and Settlement of Mass Claims (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2013), p. 98. 
143 Dutch Civil Code, Art. 7:907. 
144 Not stipulated in the WCAM, but added by Art. 2.6 of the Act on the Enforcement of Consumer Protection 
Law. 
145 Weber 2014 (n 139), p. 168. 
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public policy by the objecting parties.146 Ultimately, the limited restrictions on representative 
entities and the lack of funding regulation in the WCAM can be powerful incentives for 
bringing large-scale low-value claims. 
 
Once a consensual out-of-court settlement has been reached, the parties must jointly request 
approval from the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review the 
settlement. One of the reasons for appointing this particular court to determine all WCAM 
settlements was the possibility to benefit from the financial expertise of its Enterprise 
Division.147 In case the Court disapproves of the settlement, the parties could jointly appeal to 
the Dutch Supreme Court, which would act in cassation.148 The settlement should contain a 
overview of the damage-causing event, any distinctions between the different categories of 
victims, an approximate number of victims, the compensation awarded for each victim per 
category and the conditions the victims need to fulfill to receive the compensation.149 When 
deciding whether to approve the settlement, the Court considers various elements, for 
instance: (1) the ‘reasonableness’ of the compensation amount, (2) the appropriateness of the 
representative entity to represent the collective interests of the victims, (3) the number of 
victims intended to be covered, (4) whether sufficient security is present for the payment of 
the compensation amount, (5) the reasonableness of the conditions under which the victims 
can claim their individual compensation amount, (6) whether the interests of the victims 
cannot be safeguarded in other ways.150 In case the legal counsel’s fee is extracted from the 
settlement, the court would assess it under the general ‘reasonableness’ review.151 The Court 
also has additional powers: it can seek the counsel of experts,152 suggest changes to the 
settlement (although the parties are not obliged to accept them)153 and assign the costs of 
undertaking the negotiations to one of the parties after the approval of the settlement.154  
 
Key safeguards were established by notifying all ‘interested parties’ (i.e. the non-participating 
victims) and providing an opportunity to opt-out at any stage of the proceedings. The 
notification is a two-stage process, which requires a notice once the settlement has been 
                                                            
146 Tzankova & Hensler 2013 (n 142), p. 101. 
147  B. Krans, ‘The Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages’ (2014) Global Business & 
Development Law Journal Vol. 27(2), 281, p. 295. 
148 Krans 2014 (n 147), p. 288. 
149 Dutch Civil Code, Art. 7:907(2). 
150 Dutch Civil Code, Art. 7:907(3). 
151 Tzankova & Hensler 2013 (n 142), p. 100. 
152 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 1016. 
153 Dutch Civil Code, Art. 7:907(4). 
154 Weber 2014 (n 139), p. 171. 
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submitted for approval and again once the final settlement has been declared binding by the 
court. The notification requirements can be modified by the Court, but generally, they must 
involve direct contact with known victims (i.e. by mail) and a public notification in the 
newspapers for the unknown victims.155 In case the victims reside abroad, the Court would 
additionally scrutinize the notice according to international and European instruments.156 As a 
minimum standard, the victims have at least 3 months to opt-out after the final notification 
has been issued.157 The settlement could be made conditional on an opt-out percentage, so that 
it could be terminated in case the coverage turns out to be too small.158 Overall, this two-stage 
notification process, coupled with court scrutiny, appears adequate to safeguard the interests 
of non-participating victims. 
 
Finally, a decisive element of the WCAM’s attraction is its broad jurisdictional application. In 
particular, the 2010 Converium settlement extended its scope significantly, since none of the 
liable parties and only 3% of the victims were from the Netherlands.159 As highlighted in 
chapter 2 of this thesis, the existing EU private international regime is not adequate for 
addressing collective proceedings. However, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal has developed 
two interpretations of the existing regime in order to facilitate the cross-border opt-out 
application of the settlement. One interpretation considers the infringers to be the 'claimants' 
and the victims to be the 'defendants' for the purposes of Brussels I Regulation Recast. Since 
the settlement represents a consensual agreement, not adversarial litigation, then the nature of 
the claimants and defendants would not depend on the infringement itself, but rather, against 
whom the settlement would be enforced. Accordingly, Art. 8(1) of the Brussels I Regulation 
Recast could be used to claim jurisdiction over multiple defendants that are not domiciled in 
the Netherlands, if the claims are found to be 'so closely connected' that there would be a risk 
of irreconcilable separate judgments.160  Another jurisdictional interpretation focuses on the 
Netherlands as the 'place of performance' in Art. 7(1) of the Brussels I Regulation Recast. It 
would deem all relevant parties to be bound by the 'matters relating to the contract', including 
                                                            
155 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 1017(3). 
156 Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the 
service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, OJ L 324; 
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters 
(Hague, 1965). 
157 Dutch Civil Code, Art. 7:908(2). 
158 W.H. van Boom, ‘Collective Settlements of Mass Claims in the Netherlands’ (2009) Rotterdam Institute of 
Private Law Accepted Paper Series, p. 15. 
159 H. Van Lith, The Dutch Collective Settlements Act and Private International Law (Maklu 2011), p. 22. 
160 Tang 2015 (n 121), p. 321-322. 
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the compensation stipulated in the settlement.161 For victims that are domiciled outside of the 
EU, Art. 3 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure is used to declare a 'sufficiently close 
connection' to the Dutch legal order. 
 
4.1.2 Public enforcer capacities 
 
In order to gain a better understanding of the Dutch regulatory enforcement architecture 
beyond the private enforcement toolbox, the following section will outline additional 
elements that can indicate the public enforcer’s capacities to facilitate collective ADR. The 
relevant public enforcer is the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) that 
was created following the merger between the Consumer Authority, Competition Authority 
and Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority on 1 April 2013. 
 
Treatment of voluntary compensation - According to the ACM Fining Policy Rule, voluntary 
compensation is regarded as a mitigating circumstance that may be taken into account when 
setting a fine. Art. 2.10 stipulates that the infringer 'providing full compensation to the parties 
injured' is considered to be such a circumstance.162 The wording of the article suggests that 
only ‘full compensation’ is covered, however, no further guidance is provided. In practice, 
several instances of voluntary compensation can be identified: The 2005 Interpay case 
featured two voluntary redress schemes that resulted in an 18% fine reduction. Interpay is a 
joint venture for a PIN-transaction network service between Dutch banks and functions as the 
sole provider, which compels retailers to buy their services to use PIN payments with their 
customers. 163  In 2004, the Competition Authority established that Interpay abused its 
dominance by charging excessive prices and that, as shareholders, the Dutch banks were 
engaging in an agreement and/or a concerted practice with the object of preventing, restricting 
or distorting competition.164 After the 2005 administrative appeal, the parties negotiated a 
structured resolution, which included: (1) the creation of a €10 million fund by donating to 
the Foundation for the Promotion of Efficient Payments (Stichting Bevorderen Efficiënt 
Betalen), and (2) the creation of a redress scheme that offers the retailers a 1 cent discount for 
                                                            
161 Van Lith 2011 (n 159), p. 50. 
162 Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs, ‘Policy rule of the Minister of Economic Affairs, no. WJZ/14112617, on 
the imposition of administrative fines by the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets’, 4 July 2014. 
163  M. Bredenoord-Spoek, ‘The Dutch Competition Authority Considers Cooperation and Joint Selling of 
Network Services for PIN-transactions to be an Infringement of the Cartel Prohibition (Interpay)’ (2005) e-
Competitions Bulletin Excessive Prices Art. No. 35979. 
164 Superunie vs Interpay, Dutch Competition Authority, 28 April 2004, Case no. 2978/56. 
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every PIN transaction. In return, they received a fine reduction (from €17 million to €14 
million) regarding the cartel and the abuse of dominance charges were dropped. 165  In 
addition, the 2004-2005 Construction Cartel case featured a voluntary redress scheme that 
resulted in a fine reduction amounting to 10% of the compensation amount paid, with an 
upper limit of a 10% reduction of the total fine amount.166 More than 1300 construction 
undertakings were involved in a public tender bid-rigging cartel. Approximately 90% of the 
undertakings agreed to a fast-lane procedure (resulting in a 15% fine reduction) and 
approximately 25% of the undertakings also benefitted from leniency. Interestingly, the victim 
that received the compensation was the Dutch Government (including central and local 
governments), which could have played a role in the development and approval of this redress 
scheme. 
 
Availability of negotiation procedures - Voluntary compensation has often occurred in the 
context of negotiation procedures between the public enforcer and the infringers. The 
procedural flexibility to ‘negotiate’ is largely derived from Dutch administrative law.167 In 
addition, a formal procedure for commitment decisions was introduced through legislative 
amendments in Chapter 5A of the Dutch Competition Act in 2007. If successful, negotiations 
between the ACM and the undertakings would result in an enforceable formal decision and 
the termination of the investigation. 168  Cartel settlement procedures, which result in an 
infringement decision and a fine reduction, are formally not available.169 However, similar 
settlements were facilitated in the context of a ‘fast-lane procedure’, which required the 
undertakings to waive certain procedural rights and agree not to contest the facts, legal 
assessment and fines. The procedure resulted in fine reductions, which were given in addition 
to any reductions received through leniency. However, this procedure has not been codified in 
the relevant instruments nor has it been used in the same manner since its initial development 
for the construction cartel. 
 
                                                            
165 Authority for Consumers and Markets, ‘Press Release: NMa Reviews Fines Imposed on Banks and Interpay’, 
22 December 2005. 
166  O.W. Brouwer, ‘Antitrust Settlements in the Netherlands: A Useful Source of Inspiration?’ in C.D. 
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Treatment of self-regulatory compliance -  The promotion of self-regulatory compliance 
efforts can be indicative of the openness to facilitate compliance-oriented enforcement 
strategies. The ACM Fining Policy Rule does not list self-regulatory compliance programmes 
or other compliance efforts as relevant mitigating circumstances. It has also not published any 
guidelines on what well-functioning compliance programme might look like. However, in 
general terms, the ACM has promoted the development of self-regulatory compliance systems 
by undertakings, since it deems them to be a suitable mechanism for avoiding competition 
infringements altogether. 170  Compliance programmes have also been accepted in several 
commitment decisions.171 Interestingly, compliance programmes have received more explicit 
attention in the telecommunications sector, which now falls under the supervision of the ACM 
since the 2013 merger. 172  For instance, the 2006 KPN case regarding illegal customer 
discounts featured fine reductions for both voluntary compensation and the creation of a 
compliance programme. Moreover, the regulator essentially co-developed the compliance 
programme together with KPN. These actions reflected the regulator’s desire to focus more 
on the ex ante prevention of breaches and to build ‘high trust’ with the regulatees. 173 
Ironically, KPN was subsequently found to have infringed again and this time around the 
regulator used the existence of the compliance programme as an aggravating measure to 
increase the fine.174 
 
4.2 The United Kingdom 
 
4.2.1 Toolbox of collective proceedings 
 
As of 1 October 2015, the UK features the first tailor-made EU competition enforcement 
architecture that integrates collective ADR. This section will provide an overview of the three 
devices, which were introduced by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 as amendments to the 
                                                            
170 A. Ottow, Market and Competition Authorities: Good Agency Principles (Oxford University Press 2015), p. 
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Competition Act 1998:175 (1) opt-in/opt-out collective litigation, (2) opt-in/opt-out collective 
settlements, and (3) voluntary redress schemes. It is important to note that these devices are 
sector-specific to competition law infringements. In addition to the devices above, there are 
general collective joinder procedures (Group Litigation Order, representative joinders, test 
claim joinders) that bundle individually brought claims.176 However, in case of large-scale 
low-value claims, the existence of the joinder device would not create significant incentives 
for the voluntary initiation of collective ADR, since the victims are unlikely to bring 
individual claims in the first place. 
 
Collective litigation 
 
The collective litigation device housed in Section 47B of the Competition Act did not feature 
an opt-out model prior to the 2015 amendments. However, the opt-out model was introduced 
with two restrictions: (1) the Competition Appeal Tribunal has discretion to decide whether 
the collective claim should proceed on an opt-in or opt-out basis, and (2) the opt-out only 
applies for victims domiciled in the UK, whereas non-domiciled victims must explicitly opt-
in.177 The claimants could be consumers and businesses, although the policy discussions 
preceding the Consumer Rights Act were largely geared at consumers. Ultimately, including 
businesses in collective litigation was found to be especially helpful for SME-s.178 
 
In order to litigate, a representative entity would have to be established. The Court would only 
authorise representative entities if they consider their appointment to be ‘just and reasonable’, 
taking into account: their capacity to act ‘fairly and adequately’ in the best interests of the 
class, whether it is a pre-existing entity, whether it is a member of the class itself, its ability to 
meet the costs of the proceedings and the existence of conflicts of interest.179 The CAT Rules 
do not contain any further limitations, which suggests that law firms and special purpose 
vehicles can be representative entities as well, although their exclusion was explicitly 
                                                            
175 The Consumer Rights Act entered into force on 1 October 2015. The new regime applies to claims that were 
raised from that date onwards, even if the infringement took place earlier. While the amended provisions are 
brief, detailed information can be found in two additional sources: the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 
and the Competition and Markets Authority’s Guidance on the approval of voluntary redress schemes for 
infringements of competition law. 
176 Civil Procedure Rules 19.11, 19.6, 19.15. 
177 Competition Act 1998 47B(4)-(7), 47B(11); Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 79(3). 
178 UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills, ‘Private Actions in Competition Law: A Consultation on 
Options for Reform - Government Response’, January 2013, section 5.19. 
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suggested by the Government in its response during the policy discussions.180 If discretion 
was indeed left for the Court in this regard, then the creation of financial incentives for 
representing large-scale low-value claims could be ensured. 
 
The Court would then determine whether the presented claims raise ‘the same, similar or 
related issues of fact or law’, which were also defined in the CAT Rules as ‘common 
issues’.181 The suitability of joining the claims would depend on the predicted cost and benefit 
ratio, the size and nature of the class, the availability of ADR, and the existence of CMA-
approved voluntary redress schemes or any other attempts at voluntary compensation.182 
Approving an opt-out application would additionally depend on an assessment of the strength 
of the claims and the individual damages amounts that victims could retrieve through an opt-
in application. 183  Overall, the standards of scrutiny appear to be very responsive to the 
circumstances of the case (i.e. sensitive to the difficulties of large-scale low-value claims) and 
create direct incentives for the initiation of collective ADR by taking the voluntary 
compensation efforts into account. 
 
If the collective proceedings were successful, then the compensation would be made available 
for the victims. In case an opt-out model applied, the Court would have the obligation to 
award damages to the representative entity or any other person that it ‘thinks fit’, whereas in 
case of opt-in, it would have the discretion not to do so.184 Any unclaimed damages resulting 
from an opt-out model could have two outlets: a cy-près donation to the Access to Justice 
Foundation or the assignment of a part or all of the unclaimed damages to the representative 
entity to cover litigation costs.185 Considering that contingency fees and exemplary damages 
are prohibited,186 retaining the possibility of obtaining parts of the damages would reduce the 
level of risk involved. Ultimately, the provisions appear to strike a careful balance between 
safeguards and financial incentives, but due to the level of discretion left to the Court, it 
remains to be seen how the device will function in practice.  
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Collective settlements 
 
The collective settlement regime features two distinct devices: (1) The first device is a section 
49A settlement, which only applies in the context of ongoing collective litigation. Once the 
collective litigation proceedings have been initiated, then resorting to ‘regular’ settlements 
outside of the framework of this regime would be prohibited.187 The Government justified this 
exclusion as a way of preventing the defendant from making low settlement offers. Concerns 
would arise if the claimants were to reject a low settlement offer and then become liable for 
litigation costs in case they lost.188 The Government found the more regulated settlement 
framework to be better suited for protecting the interests of the victims.189 The regulated 
framework represents a tradeoff that protects the interests of representative entities and 
ultimately still creates incentives for bringing collective claims. (2) The second device is a 
section 49B settlement, which can apply even if no collective litigation has been started. At 
first sight, the utility of introducing a second judicially-approved settlement device could 
appear questionable.190 However, this settlement device is mainly meant to facilitate voluntary 
compensation efforts that have arisen without the threatening existence of a certified 
collective litigation claim. It would be counterintuitive to only make opt-out settlements 
available in the context of litigation - especially in cases, where all of the parties have reached 
a consensual outcome, but the infringers would have to be formally sued before the parties 
have access to a settlement approval process.191 
 
An application for settlement approval could either be made after a litigation order has been 
issued, in case of a 49A settlement, or at an earlier stage, in case of a 49B settlement.192 In the 
first scenario, by issuing the litigation order, the CAT has already determined that the class 
has an eligible claim that meets the conditions regarding the strength of the claim, the 
suitability of the representative entity, the size and nature of the class etc. In the second 
scenario, lacking an existing order, the CAT would undertake a similar certification process 
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oriented towards a settlement.193 The application for approval must be made together by the 
defendant and the representative entity.194 It must contain a statement stipulating that the 
settlement terms are ‘just and reasonable’ with supporting evidence by experts, as well as 
details of the claims covered, notification arrangements for non-participating victims and 
distribution plans for the compensation.195 The Court could follow up with directions, after 
which a hearing will be held and the settlement terms will be scrutinized. The settlement 
would have to meet the ‘just and reasonable’ review standard, which covers the damages 
amount offered, the number of persons covered, the expert opinions, the duration, cost and 
chances of success with collective litigation, especially if it would be possible to obtain 
compensation amounts ‘significantly in excess’ of what the settlement offers.196  
 
If the settlement is approved, then the compensation will be made available to the victims 
according to the terms of the settlement. There appear to be no provisions prescribing the 
treatment of unclaimed settlement funds.197 However, the plans for unclaimed funds are taken 
into account in the ‘just and reasonable’ scrutiny. Interestingly, the possibility of reverting 
funds back to the defendant is explicitly allowed.198  
 
Voluntary redress schemes 
 
The voluntary redress schemes, housed in Sections 49C, 49D and 49E of the Competition Act, 
stand separate from the two devices mentioned above, since their existence is not contingent 
on the victims initiating collective litigation. In essence, this form of voluntary compensation 
can be viewed as an infringer-led out-of-court settlement, which requires the victims to opt-in 
by accepting the settlement amount. In other words, the settlement does not have res judicata 
effect on all relevant victims in an opt-out manner. The schemes are also not overseen by the 
CAT, but instead by the CMA or other sector-specific regulators with competition powers.199 
A scheme can be approved simultaneously with the issuing of the CMA infringement decision 
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or as a follow-on initiative in case of pre-existing infringement decisions by the CMA or 
European Commission.200  
 
The most significant incentive for initiating a voluntary redress scheme is the possibility of 
receiving up to 20% fine reductions. 201  This option is only available in the context of 
upcoming CMA infringement decisions and subject to the CMA’s discretion, although it states 
that a fine reduction would be awarded ‘in the majority of the cases’.202 If the applicant has 
proposed a scheme that the CMA would strongly consider approving, then the early intention 
to award a fine reduction would be mentioned in the draft penalty statement, making it visible 
for all parties to the investigation. When deciding the fine reduction percentage, the CMA 
would consider the terms and administrative costs of the scheme, the size of the penalty, as 
well as the existence of leniency and settlements. However, it would not consider issues such 
as the nature and gravity of the infringement.203  
 
Remarkably, the task of devising the scheme was granted to third parties: the Chairperson and 
the Board. The applicant can only appoint the Chairperson, who should be a senior lawyer or 
judge with sufficient demonstrable knowledge of competition law. The Chairperson would 
then appoint the members of the Board, who should include an economist, an industry expert, 
a person representing the interests of the beneficiaries of the scheme (e.g. a consumer body, 
trade association) and any other person suitable due to their expert knowledge. 204  The 
applicant would pay for their services and the payment could not be contingent on the 
outcome of the final assessment of the scheme.205 The Chairperson and the Board would have 
to meet standards of independence, impartiality, objectivity, integrity and honesty; and 
perform their duties with reasonable skill and care, in accordance with the law and rules 
relating to their professional conduct. This means that any actual or potential conflicts of 
interest, which might cause them to favour the applicant or the beneficiaries, are prohibited 
and would have to be disclosed.206 The Chairperson and the Board are expected to engage in 
extensive fact-finding and cooperation with the applicant, while respecting confidentiality 
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with regards to sensitive information.207 They are expected to work within the parameters and 
wishes suggested by the applicant, but they are allowed to go beyond them.208 Ultimately, it is 
up to the Chairperson and the Board, not the applicant, to devise a comprehensive redress 
scheme that addresses the nature of the potential beneficiaries (e.g. whether indirect 
purchasers would be covered), the types of loss that are recoverable, the type of compensation 
offered (whether it is monetary or non-monetary compensation; although a choice between 
the two is insisted on by the CMA), the process of applying for compensation, the evidence 
requirements, the existence of a complaints process in case of the rejection of a beneficiary’s 
claim, the advertisement plans (in addition to the publication of the schemes on the 
Government’s websites), and the legal consequences of accepting compensation under the 
scheme.209 
 
Although the CMA has the power to grant final approvals, it is not meant to carry out a 
detailed external review of the scheme, especially when it would ‘duplicate or undermine’ the 
work of the Chairperson and the Board. 210  In its review, the CMA can consider the 
compensation amount offered, the duration of the scheme, advertising, evidence requirements, 
the legal consequences of the acceptance of redress, the position of vulnerable consumers, the 
objectivity and independence of the Chairperson and the Board, as well as any dissenting 
views from the applicant, the Chairperson or the Board.211 Although the initiation of the 
scheme is voluntary, once the CMA gives its approval, the compensating party is under a legal 
duty to comply. The duty is owed to the beneficiaries of the scheme, who can bring civil 
proceedings in case of non-compliance.212 The schemes that relate to upcoming infringement 
decisions can be approved conditionally on the basis of an outline, subject to providing 
further details about the redress scheme in the future. Even if conditional approval was 
granted, the CMA reserves the right to approve the same scheme under other conditions, 
approve a different scheme as a replacement or withdraw the approval altogether. 213 
Interestingly, the CMA was also granted the power to recover ‘reasonable costs’ for its 
services in facilitating the voluntary redress schemes. It will be interesting to see how the 
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CMA approaches its cost recovery powers in practice, especially since it is allowed to revoke 
the entire scheme in case of non-payment. 
 
4.2.2 Public enforcer capacities 
 
In order to gain a better understanding of the UK regulatory enforcement architecture beyond 
the private enforcement toolbox, the following section will outline additional elements that 
can indicate the public enforcer’s capacities to facilitate collective ADR.  The relevant public 
enforcer is the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) that was created following the 
merger between the Office of Fair Trading and Competition Commission on 1 April 2014. 
 
Treatment of voluntary compensation - As already outlined in the previous section, the new 
voluntary redress scheme framework constitutes the first highly regulated attempt at inducing 
voluntary compensation. Outside of this framework, the fining guidelines do not list voluntary 
compensation as a mitigating factor. However, in practice, compensation has been 
acknowledged as a relevant circumstance on rare occasions. For instance, the 2006 
Independent Schools case featured a voluntary redress scheme that resulted in a fine 
reduction. 214  The case involved fifty non-profit schools that engaged in an information 
exchange regarding the fixing of tuition fees for upcoming years. Their regular and systematic 
exchange constituted as an agreement or a concerted practice with the object of preventing, 
restricting or distorting competition. After the Statement of Objections was published, the 
schools engaged in negotiations with the OFT and reached the following resolution: 
admittance to the infringement, an ex gratia payment of £3 million to an educational trust 
fund for the benefit of the students that attended the schools during the infringement, and a 
reduced fine of £10 000 for each school.215 Next to inducing voluntary compensation, it was 
also the first time that the public enforcer used a cartel settlement procedure. The OFT Chief 
Executive noted that the decision illustrated their responsiveness to 'consider innovative 
solutions' in special cases.216 With the 2015 reforms that introduced regulated ‘voluntary 
redress schemes’, it remains to be seen how much room was left to develop any additional 
and innovative compensatory outcomes. 
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Availability of negotiation procedures - Considerations for voluntary compensation could 
emerge in the context of negotiation procedures between the public enforcer and the 
infringers. Commitment decisions were introduced through legislative amendments in Section 
31A of the Competition Act in 2004. The accompanying guidance outlines the circumstances 
under which the enforcer may consider accepting commitments. If successful, the procedure 
would result in an enforceable formal decision and the termination of the investigation.217 In 
addition, following the Independent Schools case discussed above, various settlement-type 
procedures (often referred to as ‘early resolution’) were informally applied. More detailed 
guidance was introduced in 2014, outlining the specifics of the formal settlement procedure. 
The settlement requires, among other things, a voluntary admission of guilt and could result 
in up to a 20% or 10% fine reduction, depending on whether the procedure occurred before or 
after the Statement of Objections was issued.218 These reductions would be in addition to any 
reductions received through leniency.219  
 
Treatment of self-regulatory compliance - Self-regulation has enjoyed a prominent place 
within the enforcement strategies of various UK sector-specific regulators and has been 
systematically promoted by the government.220 To some extent, the CMA also reflects this 
policy approach by acknowledging and actively promoting the development of self-regulatory 
compliance programmes by the undertakings. The existence of well-functioning compliance 
programmes or other 'adequate steps' to ensure compliance are deemed to be mitigating 
factors that can result in up to a 10% fine reduction.221 However, the mere existence of a 
compliance programme would not suffice. The undertaking would have to prove that they 
took the necessary steps to ensure the functioning and maintenance of the programme. 
Interestingly, the CMA reserves the right to use the existence of a compliance programme as 
an aggravating factor in exceptional cases, where, for example, the undertaking used it to 
deceive the enforcer and conceal an infringement. 222  The CMA has published extensive 
guidance documents on how to ensure compliance with competition law and even developed 
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special guides for small businesses.223 It promotes a ‘four-step risk-based approach’ that 
includes: (1) risk identification, (2) risk assessment, (3) risk mitigation, and (4) regular 
programme review.224 Its understanding of self-regulatory compliance programmes is in line 
with the behavioural findings and organisational studies that view a top-down commitment to 
compliance as an essential component for the development of a compliance culture.225 In 
2015, the CMA published a study on the undertakings’ understanding of competition law, 
including their perception of the most important reasons for compliance and their awareness 
of the consequences of non-compliance.226 According to the findings, undertaking of all sizes 
are not as familiar with competition compliance issues as expected, which would suggest that 
the current guidance might not be effective.227 
 
4.3 Comparative analysis 
 
Having obtained a sufficiently detailed overview of both national architectures, this section 
will continue with a comparative analysis. In particular, a selection of key issues will be 
analyzed in more depth: (1) the incentives that the architecture provides to initiate collective 
ADR, (2) the funding incentives for representative entities, (3) the structural differences 
between the two architectures, (4) the fairness review that the compensatory outcome is 
subjected to, and (5) the role of the public enforcer in facilitating collective ADR. Before 
starting the analysis, some preliminary consideration will be given to certain common 
denominators between the Netherlands and the UK, which could affect the broader 
discussions on the introduction of a collective ADR model: their general attitude towards 
ADR in civil justice and their possible aspiration to attract international legal activity. 
 
Firstly, the presence of ADR in civil justice systems is notable in both the Netherlands and the 
UK. The Dutch dispute resolution landscape is illustrated by the large percentage of out-of-
court resolutions and the proliferation of ADR entities, which reflects the alleged cultural 
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tendency towards conflict-avoidance and negotiated settlements.228 The Dutch government 
has promoted ADR in order to prevent unnecessary burdens on civil courts and develop a 
more efficient justice system. 229  The courts encourage settlements and regularly make 
voluntary referrals to mediation. Moreover, there is a national network of Consumer 
Complaint Boards (Geschillencommissie) that provide dispute resolution services in B2C 
situations, which result in a binding outcome for the undertaking. However, these ADR 
entities have not yet managed collective cases. Finally, arbitration is generally used for 
industry and trade disputes, partly as a result of the existence of renowned sector-specific 
institutions.230 In the UK, Lord Woolf’s Access to Justice review and the subsequent 1999 
reforms of the civil justice systems in England and Wales ushered in a significant emphasis on 
ADR. The courts were tasked with various case-management powers, coupled with the 
objective of promoting consensual dispute resolution throughout the civil proceedings231 and 
the use of ADR was directly incentivized by taking its use into account when deciding the 
amount of costs related to the litigation process.232 Moreover, many disputes are handled by 
the numerous sector-specific ADR entities that can impose a binding outcome on the 
undertakings, which is illustrative of the broader encouragement of self-regulation in the 
UK. 233  Self-regulation, coupled with ADR mechanisms, is strengthened by statutory 
provisions, supervision by public regulators, codes of conduct, government funding and 
education.234 Arbitration is generally used for industry and trade disputes, and the UK houses 
several important international arbitral entities. Overall, it is likely that the favourable attitude 
towards ADR in civil justice could have a certain impact on the functioning and potential 
success of collective ADR in both countries. 
 
Secondly, it has been suggested that the Netherlands and the UK aspire to become the 
hotspots for international legal activity.235 If this hypothesis is true, then it could explain and 
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influence the development of particular models of collective redress. Even after the 2013 
Commission Recommendation on Collective Redress, the European landscape of collective 
proceedings is diverse and a predominant model cannot be said to have emerged yet. 
Moreover, the fragmentation is fueled by the lack of a tailor-made EU private international 
law regime for collective proceedings. Against this background, regulatory competition could 
occur between different national regimes, as well as between public and private devices.236 
The choice between different national regimes could include various parameters, such as the 
efficiency and reputability of the civil justice system as a whole. However, when choosing an 
avenue for collective redress, particular parameters could be determinative. Firstly, in order to 
attract collective legal activity from other jurisdictions, the availability of collective devices 
with a broad scope is essential. Secondly, the facilitation of an opt-out model could provide a 
competitive advantage, which enables infringing undertakings and representative entities to 
achieve once-and-for-all solutions by providing the broadest coverage of victims. Thirdly, 
given the low cost, speed and flexibility of ADR mechanisms, the creation of collective ADR 
devices could be very attractive for undertakings that can be incentivized to offer 
compensation proactively. Adopting all three of the aforementioned measures is likely to 
indicate the willingness and desire to facilitate international legal activity in the form of 
collective redress. 
 
Overview  
 
To recap, the core components of both regulatory enforcement architectures are summarized 
in the table below with collective ADR devices highlighted in grey: 
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Architectural component UK Netherlands 
Collective litigation Yes - opt-out/opt-in collective 
litigation subject to the 
discretion of the CAT. 
Competition-specific regime. 
Opt-out application limited to 
UK domiciled victims. 
No. However, opt-out 
collective litigation exists, 
but does not provide 
‘damages’ as a remedy. 
Collective settlements Yes - opt-out/opt-in collective 
settlement. 
Opt-out application limited to 
UK domiciled victims. Section 
49A settlement only applicable 
in case of ongoing collective 
litigation. Section 49B 
settlement applicable for other 
scenarios. 
Yes - opt-out collective 
settlement. Opt-out 
application worldwide. 
Regulated voluntary 
compensation: 
voluntary redress schemes 
Yes. Schemes function like an 
opt-in settlement. Up to 20% 
fine reduction. 
No. 
Other voluntary 
compensation 
No, formally not a mitigating 
factor. 
Yes, mitigating factor leading 
to fine reductions. 
Self-regulatory compliance Yes, mitigating factor leading 
to fine reductions. 
No, formally not a mitigating 
factor. 
Negotiation procedures Yes, commitments and 
settlements. 
Yes, commitments. 
Settlements formally not 
available. 
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The comparative analysis now shifts to a more in-depth assessment of the five key categories 
that are deemed most crucial for the success of the collective ADR model: 
 
(1) Structural incentives for collective ADR 
 
In the Netherlands, collective ADR was introduced through opt-out collective settlements. 
The WCAM works well in situations, where the infringer finds the achievement of once-and-
for-all opt-out settlements to be attractive due to its goodwill or in case the incentives are 
provided by external sources. The latter scenario can arise if the infringer is facing collective 
litigation in another jurisdiction or individual litigation in multiple jurisdictions. If the 
infringer is cooperative, the WCAM would be an excellent device, since the resulting 
settlement would be court approved and thereby secure legal certainty insofar as possible 
under the existing private international law regimes. The jurisdictional claims asserted 
through the WCAM have been particularly bold, covering international victims and 
infringers. However, in case the infringer is not cooperative, then the WCAM might not create 
sufficient incentives on its own. As a public trigger, the public enforcer provides direct 
incentives through fine reductions, since it considers compensation efforts as mitigating 
factors when setting the fine. However, there is a notable lack of a relevant opt-out collective 
litigation device. Amending their existing opt-out collective litigation device by adding the 
possibility to obtain damages as a remedy, would change the situation and be likely to create 
sufficient incentives to initiate collective ADR. 
 
In the UK, collective ADR was introduced through competition-specific opt-out collective 
settlements and voluntary redress schemes. Although initiating collective ADR is entirely 
voluntary, strong private and public trigger incentives were set in place. The biggest incentive 
for early voluntary compensation is the possibility to receive up to 20% fine reductions. 
Moreover, collective ADR was carefully integrated into the broader collective proceedings 
framework. The introduction of opt-out collective litigation can be a significant incentive, as 
long as the victims and their representatives have access to sufficient funding in order to 
materialize the threat of litigation. However, the impact of the opt-out model is somewhat 
diluted by restricting its automatic application to UK residents, while the rest of the victims 
would have to opt-in. Voluntary compensation efforts, either privately or through the CMA-
approved redress schemes, have a direct impact on any subsequent collective proceedings, 
since the initial application would have to include a statement whether the parties have 
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attempted to use ADR. This would bring their ADR history (or lack thereof) to the attention of 
the CAT right from the beginning of the proceedings. Collective ADR is thereafter taken into 
account when deciding whether to authorise collective proceedings on an opt-out basis, 
whether particular claims are eligible for the collective proceedings, and when determining 
the amount of recoverable litigation costs. Overall, as long as the likelihood of collective 
litigation is considerable, the UK architecture is capable of creating sufficient private and 
public triggers to initiate collective ADR. 
 
(2) Funding of representative entities 
 
The structural incentives outlined above were primarily directed at inducing the infringing 
undertaking’s initiation of collective ADR. Once the infringer’s consent is ensured, then the 
offer to start collective ADR proceedings or to receive a complete redress scheme can be 
incentivizing enough for the representative entities or their funders due to the high certainty of 
receiving their share of the compensation. However, particularly in case the threat of 
collective litigation needs to be established in order for collective ADR to be induced in the 
first place, additional financial incentives for representative entities could be needed.  
 
The UK collective litigation device allows law firms and special purpose vehicles as 
representative entities. As a safeguard against the creation of a litigation culture, legal counsel 
was not allowed to operate with contingency fees. However, no contingency fee prohibition 
was stipulated for third party funders. Moreover, in case of unclaimed compensation 
following an opt-out application, the CAT may order that the representative entity could 
receive the damages 'in respect of the costs or expenses incurred', which would include the fee 
charged by a third party funder.237 These elements could make the funding of collective 
litigation financially incentivizing for third party funders. The Netherlands does not feature a 
collective litigation device that provides damages as a remedy. However, the treatment of 
funding under the WCAM opt-out settlement device bears a mention in case a similar 
approach were to be applied to a ligation device in the future. Notably, the WCAM sets very 
few restrictions on representative entities and allows for third party funding. Moreover, the 
judicial review of the WCAM settlement does not include the legal counsel's fees as a 
separate point of assessment. Only in case the fees are derived from the settlement amount 
would they be included in the general 'reasonableness' review of the settlement and, even 
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then, the court has been very generous in its assessment. It would also not be difficult to 
circumvent the assessment of the fees by simply agreeing to an external payment method.238 
Overall, the UK and the Netherlands have reasonably facilitated the creation of financial 
incentives for bringing collective proceedings by not creating any substantial restrictions. 
 
(3) Structural differences 
 
The scope of collective ADR in the Netherlands and in the UK is different, since the latter 
chose to limit the collective redress regime to competition claims only. A competition-specific 
collective redress regime was primarily developed due to an empirical need that was 
identified in this area, but not in others.239 The UK Government believed that the need for 
collective redress, especially using the opt-out model, should be assessed sector-by-sector 
following an impact assessment.240 In comparison, the Dutch Government maintains a general 
preference for horizontal, cross-sectoral devices. For instance, in its response to the White 
Paper on Antitrust Damages, the Dutch Government expressed disappointment with the 
choice to adopt a ‘fragmented’ competition-specific approach to collective redress. 241  
Moreover, the Dutch Government believed that the Commission failed to fully appreciate the 
potential of out-of-court settlements with broad coverage and suggested that the WCAM 
could serve as inspiration for future European developments.242 Overall, although the success 
of a collective regime would depend on a number of parameters other than its horizontal or 
vertical application, the development of some competition-specific rules could facilitate some 
flexibility with regards to problems that arise with competition damages claims. For instance, 
competition-specific treatment could be needed for the identification of a 'common interest' 
between direct and indirect purchasers, and for the approximations in quantifying damages.243 
The UK regime does not appear to address these issues explicitly, but the oversight provided 
by a specialized competition tribunal could contribute to developing workable outcomes. 
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The UK’s opt-out settlement regime is often considered to be ‘inspired’ by the Dutch opt-out 
settlement device. Indeed, both settlement regimes share many similarities regarding their 
functioning. However, there are in fact two distinct settlement devices in the UK regime: (1) 
section 49A settlements, which applies in case of ongoing collective litigation; and (2) section 
49B settlements, which can apply in other cases. Section 49A settlements are not comparable 
to the Dutch settlements, since they are not available for any type of out-of-court settlement 
scenario - they must exclusively take place in the post-certification context of ongoing 
collective litigation. Moreover, ‘regular’ out-of-court settlements would be forbidden once 
collective litigation is initiated. In comparison, the Dutch opt-out settlement device can be 
used in broader scenarios and does not have to be preceded by litigation. In that sense, only 
the section 49B settlement device resembles the Dutch settlement device. However, both opt-
out settlement devices under the UK regime are ultimately limited in their opt-out application 
- only UK domiciled victims are automatically included, whereas other victims would have to 
explicitly opt-in. In comparison, the Dutch device has been applied very generously by the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal, asserting opt-out jurisdiction over EU and non-EU victims alike. 
In sum, the Dutch opt-out settlement device has a much broader scope and cannot be 
considered an equivalent of the UK settlement devices. 
 
Both the Netherlands and the UK facilitate voluntary compensation efforts. However, the UK 
developed a highly regulated framework for ‘voluntary redress schemes’, whereas the 
Netherlands did not. The Dutch public enforcer reserved the discretion to consider any types 
of voluntary compensation efforts as mitigating factors. On the other hand, creating a 
regulated framework for voluntary compensation enables to assert more public control over 
the process and thereby ensure fairness guarantees. Moreover, by creating specific guidelines 
for the successful development of redress schemes, the infringing undertakings are given 
more certainty that their compensation efforts would result in a fine reduction. In order to 
ensure that the redress scheme is adequate, the UK framework prescribes the creation of an 
independent body of experts (a Chairperson and the Board), which must at least include an 
economist, an industry expert and a person representing the interests of the beneficiaries of 
the scheme.244 Having the independent experts design the redress schemes can ensure that 
both the requirements stipulated by the CMA as well as the expectations of the infringing 
undertaking would be reasonably met. Yet, these added layers of complexity could make the 
voluntary redress schemes a less economical choice for certain infringing undertakings, who 
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might prefer to engage in direct settlement negotiations. After all, in addition to providing the 
compensation amount, the undertaking would also have to pay for the services of the 
independent experts. Ultimately, the UK architecture does not exclude the development of 
other voluntary compensation efforts, but it only provides fine reductions for the voluntary 
redress schemes created in accordance with the regulated framework. 
 
(4) Fairness review 
 
In order to achieve the recognition and enforcement of opt-out settlements, the parties would 
have to obtain court approval through judicial review. Both the UK and the Netherlands 
subject the settlement terms to scrutiny by the Competition Appeal Tribunal and the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal, respectively.  
 
In the UK, the settlement approval process starts with class certification,245 whereby the CAT 
would review whether the representative entity is suitable and whether the claims are eligible 
for inclusion in the class.246 In making these determinations, the CAT would consider the 
existence of common issues and the broader suitability of aggregation. Importantly, the prior 
use of collective ADR would be highlighted when approving the class. Moreover, victim 
participation is ensured by allowing them to make a submission either in writing or orally 
during the certification hearing. After the settlement has been presented for approval, the CAT 
would scrutinize the settlement terms to determine whether they are ‘just and reasonable’ by 
taking into account ‘all relevant circumstances’, particularly the following factors: the 
compensation amount and settlement terms (including payment of related fees), the number 
victims covered, the predicted compensation to be obtained through collective litigation 
(especially if the amount would be significantly in excess of the settlement), the predicted 
duration and cost of collective litigation, expert opinions, victim opinions, and plans for 
unclaimed funds.247 There appear to be no further provisions prescribing the treatment of 
unclaimed settlement funds, aside from allowing for the possibility of reverting the funds 
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back to the defendant. 248  Overall, the judicial review standards allow for rather intense 
scrutiny of all relevant circumstances related to the settlement. 
 
In the Netherlands, the settlement approval process also includes a preliminary stage, 
however, it does not resemble a traditional ‘class certification’, whereby some of the 
substantive issues surrounding the collective claims would already be assessed. The 
representative parties are simply required to make a joint appeal for settlement approval, 
which is followed by a court hearing. Victim participation would be ensured through 
notification and by allowing them to make submissions during the hearing. When deciding 
whether to approve the settlement, the Court would consider various elements, such as: the 
‘reasonableness’ of the compensation amount, the appropriateness of the representative entity 
to represent the collective interests of the victims (e.g. whether the foundation or association 
fills the formal requirement of including the protection of the victims in its articles of 
association ), the number of victims intended to be covered, whether sufficient security is 
present for the payment of the compensation amount, the reasonableness of the conditions 
under which the victims can claim their individual compensation amount, and whether the 
interests of the victims cannot be safeguarded in other ways.249 In addition, the Court can 
scrutinize the notification arrangements, which have to be effective and ensure that all 
international victims are made aware of their right to opt-out.250 As is evident from the review 
conditions above, the Dutch review leaves the parties a lot of discretion to mold the 
settlement to their wishes.251 In comparison to the UK judicial review standards, the financing 
of the settlement is not subjected to detailed scrutiny, although it is partly covered by the 
general ‘reasonableness’ review. Moreover, the appropriate treatment of unclaimed settlement 
funds is not prescribed, which allows the parties to revert the funds back to the defendant or 
design a cy-près solution.252 Finally, in case the Court questions some of the fairness aspects 
of the proposed settlement, it can make non-binding suggestions and give the parties a chance 
to make amendments before rejecting it.253 Overall, the judicial review scrutinizes the key 
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elements of the settlement, however, it allows for more flexible solutions and party autonomy 
than the UK review. 
 
Different from the collective settlement procedures discussed above, the fairness of voluntary 
compensation would not necessarily be scrutinized by a public authority or a court in case the 
offer takes places outside of those frameworks. In such instances, the voluntary compensation 
efforts could take the form of a contractual agreement with a group of explicitly consenting 
victims, akin to an opt-in settlement. However, if such a compensation offer is presented with 
a view towards receiving a fine reduction, then a public enforcer could nevertheless conduct a 
review. The Dutch fining guidelines highlight voluntary compensation as a mitigating factor if 
the infringing undertaking ‘provided full compensation’ to the victims, which implies that the 
compensation must have already occurred and the enforcer would therefore not be 
‘approving’ or reviewing the compensation as such. On the other hand, the UK voluntary 
redress schemes can be developed in parallel to the public investigation and would be 
subjected to a two-layered external review process. The first layer includes independent 
experts, who would have to devise the schemes and address all the relevant aspects, such as 
the target beneficiaries and the type of loss and compensation that are recoverable.254 They 
have to balance the wishes of the infringing applicant, the interests of the victims and the 
anticipated approval considerations of the CMA, and due to the diverse composition of the 
expert body, multifaceted interests could receive an outlet. The second layer of review 
involves the final approval process by the CMA. However, the CMA is not meant to carry out 
a detailed review of the scheme, especially when it would duplicate or undermine the work of 
the independent experts. It assesses the compensation amount offered, the duration of the 
scheme, various formal requirements, the position of vulnerable consumers, the objectivity 
and independence of the experts, as well as any dissenting views from the infringing 
undertaking or the independent experts.255 Overall, although the external review of voluntary 
redress schemes is multilayered, a lot of responsibility lies with the independent experts. 
 
(5) Role of the public enforcer 
 
                                                            
254 CMA Guidance (n 199), 2.12. 
255 CMA Guidance (n 199), 3.5-3.6. In addition to assessing the fairness of the redress scheme, the CMA would 
also determine the size of the fine reduction by considering the size of the fine and the existence of other 
reductions (i.e. from leniency and settlements), but it would not take into account the nature and gravity of the 
underlying competition infringement; CMA Guidance (n 199), 3.31. 
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Unlike other UK sector-specific regulation, competition enforcement has not been developed 
in accordance with the principles underlying responsive regulation nor has the public enforcer 
received redress powers.256 In general, the public enforcement of competition law continues to 
be led by command-and-control and deterrence-oriented strategies, which do not view the 
promotion of compensation as a priority of the public enforcer. The new regime instituted by 
the Consumer Rights Act 2015 altered this paradigm with the introduction of enforcer-
approved voluntary redress schemes and thereby integrated the public enforcer into the 
promotion of collective ADR. However, it would be premature to note the emergence of a 
responsive, compliance-oriented or compensatory enforcement strategy. Similar points can be 
made for competition enforcement in the Netherlands. Although compensation efforts are 
explicitly taken into consideration as mitigating circumstances when setting the fine, 
providing redress is generally not viewed as a priority of the public enforcer. However, in the 
Dutch Government’s response to the Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, it called 
for further investigation regarding the possible role of the public supervisory authority in 
contributing to collective redress 'within the framework of executing its public task'. In 
particular, although it affirmed the maintenance of the separation between public and private 
enforcement, it proposed the exploration of the public enforcer 'promoting the initiative’ of 
the infringer to offer voluntary compensation.257 This could demonstrate the openness of the 
Netherlands to consider further integration of the public enforcer in the promotion of 
collective ADR. Overall, despite the limited connections between compensation and public 
enforcement, both the UK and the Netherlands grant an important power to the public 
enforcer, namely the inducement of collective ADR through fine reductions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
At first sight, the Netherlands and the UK share many similarities, especially regarding their 
enthusiasm to make collective redress and ADR devices more easily available for the victims 
and infringing undertakings. However, there are a number of important differences between 
their national architectures and the specific collective ADR devices they chose to develop. 
The comparative analysis studied the key issues that are crucial for the success of a collective 
ADR model under both national scenarios. In addition to outlining the detailed outcomes 
regarding the incentives, funding, procedure, fairness guarantees and interplay with public 
                                                            
256 Hodges 2015 (n 41), p. 420. 
257 Dutch Government 2008 (n 241), p. 13-14. 
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enforcers, the analysis revealed broader tendencies that distinguish both architectures. 
Importantly, the Netherlands reflected a more flexible and functional approach to collective 
ADR, whereas the UK opted for a more regulated framework to ensure fairness guarantees. 
This chapter analyzed the implications of these policy choices in the abstract, however, the 
best lessons to be learned for the development of a European collective ADR model could be 
revealed once both national regimes are faced with a competition claim involving large-scale 
low-value damage. Presently, neither Member State has had the opportunity to utilize their 
regulatory enforcement architecture in this context, but it is undoubtedly important to follow 
these developments closely in the coming years and the structured analysis developed in this 
section could help frame the discussions that follow. 
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Chapter 5: The implications of integrating collective ADR into EU competition 
enforcement 
 
The final chapter will be used to reflect on the proposal of integrating collective ADR from a 
normative, legal and practical perspective in the context of EU competition law. The first 
section will highlight the transformative impact of collective ADR on competition 
enforcement and its ability to achieve the goals of deterrence and compensation. The second 
section will take a closer look at the Commission’s role as a public enforcer in the architecture 
envisioned and its capacity to induce collective ADR, while highlighting the changes that 
would have to be made to the current architecture in order to successfully integrate collective 
ADR. 
 
5.1 Impact on the public-private interplay and the goals of enforcement 
 
Introducing a regulatory enforcement architecture that facilitates and induces collective ADR 
as the first choice compensatory avenue, would undoubtedly have an impact on the current 
state of public and private enforcement on the EU and national level. The following 
discussions will attempt to shed light on its impact from two angles, namely by addressing the 
possible repercussions for the public-private interplay and the ability of collective ADR to 
meet the declared goals of competition enforcement.  
 
Public-private transformations 
 
Despite the ease of classifying collective ADR as a ‘particularly private’ device of ‘private 
enforcement’, the integration of collective ADR could contribute to transformations that 
extend far beyond dispute resolution. The transformative power of collective ADR stems from 
public-private tensions between: (1) the public and private enforcement of competition law, 
and (2) the public and private devices of private enforcement.  
 
Within the first tension, the public and private enforcement of EU competition law have 
traditionally been viewed as serving different regulatory goals, whereby the public enforcer 
produces deterrence through fines and private actors deliver compensation through litigation. 
While it has been commonly recognized that private enforcement is also capable of producing 
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deterrent effects, it has been less accepted that public enforcement should be producing 
compensation. The successful integration of collective ADR into the competition enforcement 
architecture would entail some degree of fusion between public and private enforcement in 
order to ensure compensation for all victims. While the public enforcer would not be directly 
in charge of ordering or dispensing compensation, it would induce voluntary compensation 
efforts by taking them into account when determining the size of the fine.258 As a carrot, it 
would consider compensation as a mitigating factor, and as a stick, it could consider abusive 
or intentionally misleading use of collective ADR as an aggravating factor. Involving the 
public enforcer in this manner would not constitute a stark departure from the traditional 
distinction between public and private enforcement, however, it could signal the emergence of 
a hybrid model of enforcement, which begins to expand the role of competition authorities 
beyond policing anti-competitive conduct towards rectifying the broader societal impact of 
the infringements. It could also lead to a gradual reassessment of the public enforcement 
toolbox. In particular, the facilitation of responsive, behaviourally-informed and compliance-
oriented strategies for private enforcement could influence the strategies deployed for public 
enforcement, possibly leading to a fuller understanding of the reasons behind infringements 
and to the promotion of additional enforcement devices, such as self-regulatory compliance 
programmes and criminal penalties. 
 
Within the second tension, the public device of private enforcement is traditionally litigation 
through state-powered courts, whereas the private device could constitute various out-of-court 
dispute resolution processes and non-judicial entities. Introducing collective ADR to the 
private enforcement toolbox would reflect the increasing popularity of out-of-court dispute 
resolution and the continued exploration of collective devices in the EU. Importantly, these 
changes to private enforcement come at a cost, which could affect the prevailing 
understanding of how and to what extent justice (or more narrowly, compensation) ought to 
be delivered. For instance, with any form of collective proceedings, there are likely to be 
significant tradeoffs between individual and collective rights. Similarly, with consensual 
proceedings, the agreed outcome is likely to require some concessions from all parties. 
Ultimately, the careful integration of collective ADR into a regulatory enforcement 
architecture would provide the opportunity to shape these tradeoffs ex ante, ensure minimum 
                                                            
258 For a fuller spectrum of possible public enforcer involvement, see C. Hodges, ‘Mass Collective Redress: 
Consumer ADR and Regulatory Techniques’ (2015) European Review of Private Law Vol. 23(5), 829, p. 841-
845. 
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safeguards and regulate the competition between different devices, entities and jurisdictional 
venues.  
 
Building on the transformative themes explored above, an attempt will be made to 
conceptualize the contribution of collective ADR towards the goals of competition 
enforcement. The two enforcement goals that have been highlighted repeatedly in this thesis 
are compensation and deterrence. Firstly, compensation has been viewed as the main goal of 
the private enforcement of competition law in Europe.259 The emphasis on an individual right 
to full compensation reflects the concept of corrective justice, whereby the aim of the tort 
damages claim is for the infringer to remedy the individual harm suffered by the victim. 
Secondly, deterrence has been viewed as the main goal of public enforcement and it has also 
been accepted as an additional goal, or at least as a possible side-effect, of private 
enforcement. In the EU competition law context, the acknowledgement of the regulatory 
dimension of private claims has largely been influenced by the significant deterrent role 
assigned to private enforcement in the US. However, with both public and private 
enforcement, the concept of ‘optimal deterrence’ is likely to remain elusive for a variety of 
reasons, including the lack of direct coordination between the two. With these considerations 
in mind, the following sections will take a closer look at the impact of collective ADR on 
achieving deterrence and compensation. 
 
The impact on deterrence 
 
In the EU, deterrence is predominantly produced through imposing financial penalties on the 
infringers, which can be derived from both public and private enforcement. From a 
behavioural perspective, the precise deterrent effects of enforcement are difficult to measure, 
since it would require some insight into the subjective perceptions of the infringing 
undertakings. Nevertheless, the fundamental deterrence capacity of financial penalties has 
                                                            
259 For instance, the Commission’s press release accompanying the Damages Directive stated the following: 
“Contrary to the US system, the proposal does not seek to leave the punishment and deterrence to private 
litigation. Rather, its main objective is to facilitate full and fair compensation for victims once a public authority 
has found and sanctioned an infringement.” The emphasis on follow-on claims is notable. More broadly, this 
view was also presented in the 2008 White Paper on Damages Actions, p. 3: “The primary objective of this 
White Paper is to improve the legal conditions for victims to exercise their right under the Treaty to reparation of 
all damage suffered as a result of a breach of the EC antitrust rules. Full compensation is, therefore, the first and 
foremost guiding principle.” [emphasis added] 
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been subject to criticism.260 To illustrate, the combination of capping the size of the financial 
penalty at 10% of the annual turnover, the 13% estimated detection rate for cartels and the 
25% estimated average overcharge would generally make infringements the economically 
rational choice for undertakings.261 The low likelihood of subsequent private damages claims, 
combined with the existence of legal insurance, would not increase the financial penalty 
significantly. Moreover, in order to achieve ‘optimal deterrence’, the combined financial 
penalty would often have to be enormous. Even if such an outcome would be achieved, it 
could result in insolvency for many infringing undertakings, which could in turn have several 
undesirable effects. Moreover, financial penalties would rarely have an effect on the 
individuals that were directly responsible for the infringements.262 Understanding the limits of 
financial penalties enables a more informed assessment of collective ADR’s impact on 
deterrence. The list of negative and positive effects compiled below is not exhaustive. 
 
Negative effects: (i) In case collective ADR results in a fine reduction, the level of deterrence 
derived from the financial penalty would seemingly be reduced, since a portion would be 
subtracted from the financial penalty. A fine reduction would essentially convert some 
deterrence into compensation by redistributing some of the illegal profits directly among the 
victims of the violation. However, since the exact size of the anticipated fine reduction might 
not always be known in advance and it might also be uncertain whether all of the relevant 
victims end up claiming their share of the compensation, then the total sum paid by the 
infringer would not necessarily be foreseeable. In sum, deterrence would only be reduced in 
case the compensation amount is indeed smaller than the fine reduction received. (ii) If 
collective ADR produces fewer costs for the infringing undertaking than litigation, then its 
use would directly limit the size of the financial penalty. This reduction of deterrence is 
inevitable in cases where the threat of litigation is used to induce collective ADR, since such 
savings would be one of the key reasons why the infringers agreed to it. However, an 
exceptional scenario could be envisioned if the infringer engaged in collective ADR under the 
mistaken belief that the litigation claim would succeed, when in practice it would have not. 
 
                                                            
260 W. Wils, The Optimal Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (Kluwer Law International 2002), ch. 8; D.A. Crane, 
'Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement' (2010) Vanderbilt Law Review Vol. 63(3), 673. 
261 A. Renda, ‘Private Antitrust Damages Actions in the EU’ in H.-W. Micklitz & A. Wechsler (eds), The 
Transformation of Enforcement: European Economic Law in Global Perspective (Hart Publishing 2016), p. 275-
276. 
262 Wils 2002 (n 260). 
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Positive effects: (i) If collective ADR took the form of voluntary compensation in return for 
fine reductions, then such ‘negotiated’ infringement decisions might be less likely to be 
appealed.263 In addition, competitors that are reputationally sensitive might be less likely to 
challenge an infringement decision that involved compensating victims. This, in turn, would 
save resources for the public enforcer, who could invest more in other investigations and 
thereby the overall deterrence effect of public enforcement could be increased. (ii) If 
collective ADR leads to an increase in compensatory outcomes, then competition law would 
become more visible to the general public. This could make future victims more aware of 
their rights and more likely to engage in private enforcement or report infringements to the 
public enforcer.264 At first sight, the confidentiality of certain ADR proceedings would limit 
such publicity, however, the extensive notification requirements for collective proceedings 
that include a large number of non-participating victims could nevertheless make the 
existence of compensatory activities sufficiently public. Moreover, once infringers have 
agreed to compensate, they could additionally reap reputational benefits by ‘advertising’ their 
corporate responsibility and voluntary compensation efforts. As a side effect, the increased 
publicity for competition law among other market participants could have a positive effect on 
the deterrence of infringements. 
 
The impact on compensation 
 
Subject to the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, Courage and Manfredi established 
that ‘full compensation’ should be made available to everyone who suffered a loss resulting 
from a competition infringement.265 Full compensation includes the actual loss as well as lost 
profits and interest, which would accrue from the time the harm occurred until the 
compensation is paid.266 Full compensation is meant to represent the optimal level and any 
form of overcompensation through punitive or multiple damages has been expressly 
rejected.267 However, at the premise of this thesis lies the concern that the current state of 
private enforcement is rather producing undercompensation, particularly for victims suffering 
from large-scale low-value harm. Moreover, the precise concept of full compensation is 
                                                            
263 J.H.J. Bourgeois & S. Strievi, ‘EU Competition Remedies in Consumer Cases: Thinking Out of the Shopping 
Bag’ (2010) World Competition Vol. 33(2), 241, p. 254. 
264  Bourgeois & Strievi 2010 (n 263), p. 253-254. 
265 Courage Ltd v Crehan (n 26); Manfredi and others (n 26). These principles are now enshrined in Art. 3 and 4 
of the Damages Directive (n 2). 
266 Damages Directive (n 2), Recital 12. 
267 Damages Directive (n 2), Art. 3 (3). 
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difficult to achieve in practice, since the quantification of harm and the determination of the 
final compensatory amount are likely to be difficult and require approximations. In addition, 
the actual compensatory sum received by the victims is likely to be smaller than the full 
compensation amount once the costs of bringing the claim are taken into account. 
Understanding the limits of traditional damages claims enables a more informed assessment 
of collective ADR’s impact on compensation. The list of negative and positive effects 
compiled below is not exhaustive. 
 
Negative effects: (i) If the victims could have received a higher amount of compensation 
through litigation, then collective ADR would directly lessen the amount of compensation 
paid. This tradeoff would occur in most cases, where the threat of litigation is used to induce 
collective ADR, since such savings would be one of the key reasons why the infringers agreed 
to it. (ii) The scope of the compensation achieved through collective ADR might not cover the 
precise losses prescribed by the concept of full compensation. However, it is questionable 
whether collective litigation could achieve that standard either, considering the level of 
approximation involved, for instance, with the quantification of harm. (iii) Similarly, the 
scope of the compensation achieved through collective ADR might limit the categories of 
victims that are eligible for compensation. Selective compensating could result in weakening 
the position of those victims that would like to continue with collective litigation. 
 
Positive effects: (i) The total costs of collective ADR could be lower than the total costs of 
litigation, even if litigation would have provided a larger compensatory sum. The total cost of 
the claim includes the compensation amount, but also the legal fees and other costs associated 
with prolonged representation of the claim. Moreover, the total costs for society are likely to 
be even greater if the costs of using the court system are considered. In addition, the total 
costs would be even higher if the costs borne by the infringing undertaking would ultimately 
be passed down to other parties like consumers. (ii) A consensual agreement reached by the 
parties though collective ADR is less likely to pose problems in the enforcement stage, since 
it would generally be self-enforcing due to consensus. An adversarial outcome reached 
through litigation could entail additional costs in case of appeal or other forms of contestation. 
Furthermore, with collective ADR, the infringing undertaking would agree to a compensation 
amount that it could actually deliver, while litigation could result in a sum that might lead to 
insolvency, which could leave the victims without any compensation. (iii) The flexibility of 
collective ADR could help overcome procedural restrictions that could make collective 
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litigation problematic, for instance, the determination of a ‘common interest’ among victims 
with conflicting claims (direct and indirect purchasers), the quantification of harm and the 
evidence that must be provided for victims to claim their share. These procedural restrictions 
would have a direct impact on whether full compensation would be achieved. 
 
Deterrence, compensation and ‘resolution’ 
 
As demonstrated by the analysis above, the integration of collective ADR into the regulatory 
enforcement architecture would certainly have an impact on achieving deterrence and 
compensation. The particular outcome reached through collective ADR is unlikely to 
constitute ‘optimal deterrence’ or ‘full compensation’. However, instead of understanding that 
outcome as suboptimal deterrence and incomplete compensation, it could be defined as a 
distinct concept. In many cases, collective ADR would result in the most just and efficient 
outcome that can be achieved, while taking into account all relevant circumstances and the 
interests of all affected parties - the goal achieved in this manner could be conceptualized as 
‘resolution’. 
 
In essence, resolution represents a combination of what is just and efficient, while taking into 
account the substantive, procedural and social context and balancing the interest of all parties 
involved - not just the victims and infringers, but also the competition authorities, courts and 
society as a whole. Ultimately, by following these principles, resolution attempts to remedy 
the negative consequences of an infringement insofar as possible. Since one of the negative 
consequences of an infringement is the economic harm suffered by individual victims, then 
compensation could itself be viewed as one facet of achieving resolution. However, resolution 
should be understood as going further and encompassing broader restorative effects for all 
parties that were affected by the infringement. Put differently, resolution goes beyond 
corrective justice and places more emphasis on distributional justice, market balance and 
notions of collective fairness. Resolution is not confined to remedying the visible 
consequences of past infringements - it could also introduce a future-oriented dimension, 
whereby genuine attempts to proactively resolve both the consequences as well as the causes 
of infringements, would become more rewarding for the infringers. Finally, since no single 
enforcement strategy has been proven to be perfectly optimal or capable of addressing all of 
the negative consequences of competition infringements, then resolution could signify a third 
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strategy that not only fills the gaps left by deterrence and compensation, but also provides for 
coordination between the combined effects of all enforcement actions taken. 
 
The concept could be expanded even further and applied more broadly in the context of 
public enforcement, but for the purposes of the present inquiry, the emphasis will be on 
collective ADR’s ability to achieve ‘resolution’. From the outset, adding a speedier, cheaper 
and more consensual private enforcement avenue that is capable of covering as many victims 
as possible is very likely to be welfare-enhancing and restorative. In most cases, the outcome 
reached through collective ADR would be the most efficient way achieving compensation, as 
far as private enforcement devices are concerned. Moreover, with collective ADR, an 
immediate and adversarial interaction between the infringers and victims would be replaced 
with a more mediated interaction that involves consensus-building and distributive 
considerations. The lack of vindication could have a positive impact on the emergence of 
cooperative and compliance-oriented attitudes in the infringing undertaking. The achievement 
of a just outcome for the affected parties is further legitimized by consent and emerges from 
the consideration of all alternative avenues that are available. In case the outcome binds non-
participating victims, then their consent deficiencies could be remedied by a public fairness 
review. It is submitted that perfect procedural justice is unlikely to be obtained in a world of 
incomplete information, interpretable legal norms and private interests, neither by collective 
ADR nor collective litigation. However, collective ADR ultimately satisfies the notion of 
access to justice that is built on a contextual understanding of the needs, solutions and impacts 
of the legal response, taking into account the cultural, economic and psychological realities of 
individual and organizational behaviour.268 Furthermore, collective ADR can advance interests 
that go beyond the restoration of individual or aggregated rights. Put differently, the 
consensual resolution of the dispute could produce positive externalities that transcend the 
damages claim. For instance, the courts would be less burdened and the taxpayers would be 
spared from funding litigation that could be resolved out of court. Moreover, the leftover 
funds could be directed to a cy-prés outlet that serves broader societal interests. Leftover 
funds from compensation received in exchange for a fine reduction would be particularly 
well-suited for serving such interests, since it was deducted from a financial penalty that 
would have otherwise been directed to a public source.269 The use of collective ADR in return 
                                                            
268 This multifaceted understanding of ‘access to justice’ was acknowledged by Cappelletti 1993 (n 128), p. 283. 
269 For instance, the compensation could be viewed as serving both past and future consumers, Bourgeois & 
Strievi 2010 (n 263), p. 244. 
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for fine reductions would also ensure some coordination between the effects of public and 
private enforcement, since a reassessment of the fine would occur in light of the 
compensatory sum paid. In addition, collective ADR could serve a gap-filling purpose, not 
only in terms of providing compensation for the victims that would otherwise be left without 
a remedy, but also by creating an outlet for compliance behaviour. When compensation efforts 
are taken into account by the public enforcer or the courts, a connection is created between 
liability and self-regulation, which could make the infringing undertakings reflect internally 
on the causes for infringements and ensure that adequate prevention and mitigation structures 
are in place.270 The compliance-oriented rationale behind inducing the use of collective ADR 
is not always easy to reconcile with the deterrence-oriented rationale that is dominant in 
competition enforcement. However, when regulating behaviour, perhaps the underlying 
insights should in fact come from behavioural research, not from economic theory. If the 
current strategies fall short of achieving optimal outcomes, then the exploration of new and 
increasingly behaviourally-informed public and private enforcement strategies should be 
encouraged. Ultimately, the introduction of collective ADR into the regulatory enforcement 
architecture serves as just one example of how the ‘resolution’ approach could work, but it 
can nevertheless be viewed as an important first step in the right direction. 
 
5.2 Collective ADR in the Commission’s public enforcement policy 
 
In the regulatory enforcement architecture envisioned, the public enforcer would have an 
important role in inducing collective ADR. Although the initiation of collective ADR would 
not always be contingent on the participation of the public enforcer, their early involvement 
would lead to the speediest form of ‘resolution’ in many cases. The European Commission’s 
broader policy stance on collective redress, ADR and private enforcement has been discussed 
in the first chapter and will not be recapitulated here at length. As suggested by the research 
question in this thesis, collective ADR has not yet been integrated into the competition 
enforcement architecture on the EU level. This section will now go into more depth about the 
Commission’s current approach to collective ADR as the public enforcer of EU competition 
law. The first part will address the subject of inducing collective ADR through fine 
reductions, after which the focus will shift to other elements that can indicate the 
Commission’s capacity to integrate collective ADR and facilitate a more compliance-oriented 
enforcement strategy, namely the availability of special negotiation procedures and the 
                                                            
270 Parker 2002 (n 36), p. 253. 
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treatment of self-regulatory compliance efforts. Each part will conclude with an assessment 
on whether any changes need to be introduced in order to successfully integrate collective 
ADR. 
 
Treatment of voluntary compensation  
 
As discussed earlier, the Commission has predominantly viewed public and private 
enforcement as separate disciplines, serving the different goals of deterrence and 
compensation. It is therefore unsurprising that the official position holds that no form of 
compensation provided to the victims of competition infringements would affect the public 
enforcement process and the Commission’s Fining Guidelines do not list compensation as a 
mitigating circumstance.271 However, at least two objections could be made in this regard: 
 
Firstly, the Damages Directive offers a different perspective on whether compensation should 
affect public enforcement. To begin with, recital 5 lists ‘public enforcement decisions that 
give parties an incentive to provide compensation’ as an example of an ‘alternative’ private 
enforcement mechanism. The concept of ‘public enforcement decisions’ is only mentioned in 
this particular recital and not elaborated upon elsewhere in the Directive using that 
terminology. However, this fusion of public and private enforcement becomes most evident in 
Art. 18 (3), which explicitly allows competition authorities to take compensation into account 
as a ‘mitigating factor’ when setting the fine. This provision strengthens the legitimacy of 
inducing collective ADR through fine reductions, even if the Commission’s own guidelines 
do not yet provide for this possibility. The Commission’s proposal that the NCAs should 
consider offering fine reductions in exchange for compensation is, at the very least, 
illustrative of the fact that it does not hold any fundamental objections to the idea. 
 
Secondly, the Commission’s own case law includes several instances of taking voluntary 
compensation into account when determining the size of the financial penalty.272 The earliest 
instance occurred in General Motors Continental, where the Commission considered 
compensation as one of several mitigating circumstances. There were five cases of excessive 
charging that amounted to an abuse of dominance and GMC offered to voluntarily reimburse 
                                                            
271 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, OJ 
C 210. 
272 Ioannidou 2015 (n 4), p. 172-174. 
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the overcharge in three cases and also paid a compensation amount that exceeded the 
overcharge in two cases. 273  In Pre-Insulated Pipe Cartel, the Commission expressly 
considered compensation as the only mitigating circumstance for one member of the cartel. 
The cartelist ABB reached an agreement for a 'substantial sum' with Powerpipe, who was a 
victim and a direct competitor, and copy of the confidential settlement was sent to the 
Commission. 274  In Nintendo, the Commission expressly considered compensation as a 
mitigating circumstance and calculated a fine reduction of 300 000 euros in light of the 
compensatory amount. Nintendo offered 'substantial' financial compensation to 11 victims, 9 
of which accepted the offer. 275 When assessing these three cases, it is notable that they all 
involve out-of-court consensual compensation, but not all of them feature a significant 
collective dimension. The compensation was offered to direct purchasers and competitors, 
who are less likely to suffer the type of large-scale low-value harm that indirect purchasers 
and consumers experience. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Commission has in fact 
encouraged voluntary compensation and offered fine reductions, subject to its discretion. The 
discretionary nature was confirmed in Archer Daniels Midland, where the General Court 
stated that the Commission is not obligated to take compensation into account as a mitigating 
circumstance just because it has chosen to do so in previous cases.276 
 
Against this background and the experience of the two national systems analysed in chapter 4, 
in order to integrate collective ADR into the regulatory enforcement architecture on the EU 
level, the Fining Guidelines should be amended to include compensation as a mitigating 
circumstance. When assessing whether the compensation offered qualifies for a fine 
reduction, the Commission could make use of the benchmarks of the fairness review 
envisioned in chapter 3, which included scrutinizing the compensation achieved, the 
notification and participation rights of non-participating victims, the role of the representative 
entity and the plans for unclaimed funds. If compensation is considered as a mitigating 
circumstance, then the substantive assessment and the fine reduction amount would largely be 
subject to the Commission’s discretion and work on a case-by-case basis. The issuance of 
guidelines or best practices for the infringing undertakings could help improve the 
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predictability of the process and increase the attractiveness of collective ADR. It should be 
noted that the inclusion of compensation in exchange for fine reductions could have 
implications that go beyond inducing collective ADR. With a general power to consider 
compensation as a mitigating circumstance, the public enforcer could take any form of 
compensation into account, including the sums paid in the context of adversarial collective 
litigation. While the encouragement of voluntary and consensual compensation is the desired 
outcome, fine reductions should not necessarily be exclusively limited to ADR outcomes. In 
addition to the general inclusion of compensation as a mitigating circumstance, a more 
regulated framework could be considered. As seen in the UK architecture, the CMA was 
tasked with the approval of voluntary redress schemes, which would have to be designed in 
accordance with specific guidelines and could result in up to a 20% fine reduction. In contrast 
to the mitigating circumstance scenario highlighted above, the fine reduction would be 
directly contingent on the voluntary and consensual nature of the compensation, among other 
requirements. A more regulated framework could include requirements that go beyond the 
basic considerations in the fairness review and provide increased predictability concerning the 
steps that would have to be taken in order to receive a fine reduction. The regulated 
framework could also envision a role for external experts. For instance, the voluntary redress 
schemes in the UK prescribed the appointment of neutral third parties, who would largely be 
in charge of devising the schemes. Some of the public enforcer’s assessment tasks could 
thereby be delegated to third parties. On the one hand, this would save public resources and 
allow the enforcer to focus on the ongoing investigation, on the other, the diminished public 
review and the involvement of third parties could readily create some risks, which would have 
to be addressed. Ultimately, the integration of collective ADR into the regulatory enforcement 
architecture in exchange for fine reductions requires the acceptance of compensation as a 
mitigating circumstance and if, in addition, a particular collective ADR process is deemed to 
be desirable, then it could be promoted with specific guidelines. 
 
Availability of negotiation procedures 
 
Special negotiation procedures could serve as an additional venue for voluntary compensation 
incentives to emerge. The Commission’s toolbox includes two procedures that can be relevant 
in this regard: cartel case settlements and commitment decisions.  
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Firstly, Art. 10a of Regulation 773/2004 and the Settlements Notice established a negotiated 
settlement procedure in cartel cases, which offers the cartelists a chance to admit liability, 
cooperate and receive a 10% fine reduction, subject to the Commission’s discretion. Cartel 
case settlements are essentially procedural efficiency devices that are used to speed up cartel 
investigations, which will result in an infringement decision. The connection to inducing 
collective ADR is not immediately visible, since the settlement submission itself does not 
include any direct considerations for compensation. However, as demonstrated by the cases 
that emerged in the Netherlands and the UK, the settlement procedure and the early 
admittance of the infringement could make the cartelists consider the consequences of 
subsequent private enforcement sooner and take proactive compensatory action to mitigate 
risks.  
 
Secondly, Art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003 established the commitment decision procedure, which 
follows a preliminary assessment and offers the infringing undertakings a chance to accept 
legally binding commitments in order to have the investigation terminated, subject to the 
Commission’s discretion. The commitment decision is silent on whether there was an 
infringement, which would allow the NCAs and national courts to nevertheless find an 
infringement and award damages. The procedure is not used in hardcore cartel cases, where 
the only appropriate remedy would be a financial penalty,277 and since large-scale low-value 
harm often occurs as a result of such infringements, then this procedure would have limited 
relevance in such instances. The Commission has explicitly approved of a compensatory 
commitment in Deutsche Bahn, which concerned the pricing practices that DB Energie 
applied to German railway undertakings that bought electricity for powering locomotives.278 
DB Energie offered to pay a one-time compensatory sum to all German railway undertakings 
that did not belong to the DB Group. The sum consisted of 4% from their yearly invoice, 
based on the latest annual pricing conditions that were in place, and the Commission deemed 
it to be an adequate means for countering margin squeeze effects.279 Interestingly, in response 
to comments that the compensatory sum should have been even greater, the Commission 
stated that this compensatory payment should not be equated with ‘compensation for harm 
suffered through possible anti-competitive behaviour’ because commitment decisions do not 
result in a finding of infringement and therefore this compensatory payment is not ‘aimed to 
                                                            
277 R. Whish & D. Bailey, Competition Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 274. 
278 Commission Decision of 18 December 2013 Deutsche Bahn (COMP/AT.39678/Deutsche Bahn I, 
COMP/AT.39731/Deutsche Bahn II). 
279 Deutsche Bahn (n 278), para. 91-92. 
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directly compensate harm suffered’ as a result of an infringement. 280  It is questionable 
whether this is in fact the case, especially with regards to any subsequent damages claims 
following a possible finding of infringement by the NCAs or national courts. If the infringer 
offers voluntary compensation, then the victim, by explicitly accepting the sum, would have 
at least a part of their harm restored for tort law purposes. Moreover, the extent of the 
coverage could be subject to the terms of any agreement reached between the infringer and 
the victim. Therefore, the compensation achieved through commitments could have an effect 
on the compensation achievable for the harm resulting from an infringement.  
 
Finally, outside of the formal framework of the two negotiation procedures discussed above, 
the Commission has informally facilitated voluntary compensation in several cases, although 
the connection between the incentives provided and the voluntary compensation was less 
direct.281 To conclude, special negotiation procedures can be a relevant venue for inducing 
collective ADR, however, the effects of the procedure’s outcome should be taken into account 
when encouraging compensation at that stage, particularly if the outcome is the closing of the 
investigation. For scenarios that involve large-scale low-value harm, fine reductions would 
generally be a more appropriate venue for inducing collective ADR. Ultimately, the decision 
whether to take voluntary compensation into account in the context of such negotiation 
procedures could remain at the discretion of the Commission and be decided on a case-by-
case basis. 
 
Treatment of self-regulatory compliance 
 
The promotion of self-regulatory compliance efforts can be indicative of the openness to 
facilitate compliance-oriented enforcement strategies, not only for public, but also for private 
enforcement. Despite the Commission ‘welcoming and supporting’ all compliance efforts by 
undertakings, its policy stance has been rather categorical in excluding the direct relevance of 
                                                            
280 Deutsche Bahn (n 278), para. 93. 
281 For example, in Macron, the Commission closed the investigation after the dominant undertaking made 
informal commitments, which included paying a compensatory sum to a single complainant; in Rover, the 
Commission did not initiate an investigation, after Rover notified a revised discount scheme and offered a 1 000 
000 GBP donation to Which?, the largest consumer association in the UK; in Sony-Philips, the Commission 
cleared a Standard Licensing Agreement, which included a commitment by Philips to pay each holder of a 
license 10 000 USD, amounting to a total of 800 000 USD; Ioannidou 2015 (n 4), p. 173; Bourgeois & Strievi 
2010 (n 263), p. 248. 
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compliance programmes for the public enforcement282 and the Fining Guidelines do not list 
such programmes or other compliance efforts as relevant mitigating circumstances. The 
Commission has been confronted with the existence of self-regulatory compliance 
programmes on several occasions, however, it has never granted a fine reduction as a result of 
a pre-existing compliance programme. In some early cases, the Commission did take 
compliance efforts into account, but only when the compliance programme was set up 
following the investigation. 283  More recently in Archer Daniels Midland, in addition to 
offering voluntary compensation to the victims, ADM featured a 'rigorous and ongoing' self-
regulatory compliance programme and its level of commitment indicated a genuine desire to 
avoid infringements, however, the Commission did not consider it to be relevant. In the 
appeal, the General Court ultimately established that the Commission is not obligated to take 
these efforts into account.284  
 
It is therefore clear that compliance efforts are currently not integrated into the public 
enforcement process. However, it is submitted that the treatment of self-regulatory 
compliance programmes should be considered in the broader context of the limited deterrence 
effects that can be achieved through financial penalties. The encouragement of compliance 
could be relevant not only for public enforcement,285 but also for private enforcement and the 
inducement of collective ADR. On a more practical level, a well-functioning compliance 
programme could be utilized not only for the detection of infringements, but also for the 
mitigation of negative consequences, for instance, by tasking the same staff with the 
development and management of voluntary redress schemes. For the undertakings that are 
reputationally sensitive, both compliance and compensation would signal a similar 
willingness to accept responsibility and could be presented together as a complimentary 
package that mitigates past infringements and prevents future infringements. Moreover, 
including an ex ante commitment to mitigate harm within the self-regulatory compliance 
                                                            
282 European Commission, Compliance matters: What companies can do better to respect EU competition rules, 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012, p. 21: “If a company which has put a 
compliance programme in place is nevertheless found to have committed an infringement of EU competition 
rules, the question of whether there is any positive impact on the level of fines frequently arises. The answer is: 
No.“ 
283 W. Wils, ‘Antitrust Compliance Programmes and Optimal Antitrust Enforcement’ (2013) Journal of Antitrust 
Enforcement, Vol. 1(1), 52, p. 53; the fine reductions were granted in certain decisions taken between 1982-
1992.  
284 Archer Daniels Midland (n 276), para. 356-359. 
285 For a discussion on the potential of compliance programmes for public enforcement, see Wils 2013 (n 283); 
Lachnit 2014 (n 171); Ottow 2015 (n 170), p. 183-185; D. Geradin, 'Antitrust Compliance Programmes and 
Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: a Reply to Wouter Wils' (2013) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Vol. 1(2), 325. 
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programme could help the public enforcer in their assessment of the compliance efforts, since 
such a promise could be an indicator that the compliance programmes were not meant to be 
merely ‘window dressing’. In such cases, the undertakings would not necessarily have to be 
held accountable for a failure to keep their promise, however, their subsequent refusal to even 
accommodate collective ADR negotiations could be viewed as an aggravating circumstance 
and provide an opportunity to impose higher fines. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 
promotion of compliance behaviour might contribute to the creation of a genuine internal 
compliance culture that also involves compensating victims in case of failure. In sum, the 
treatment of self-regulatory compliance programmes could be viewed as one component of 
the broader exploration of untapped compliance-oriented strategies and it might have a 
positive impact on inducing voluntary compensation. However, collective ADR is not 
ultimately contingent on the facilitation of self-regulatory compliance programmes.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis proposes that collective ADR has the potential to provide just and efficient 
resolution for all parties directly affected by a competition infringement. In order to achieve 
that goal, collective ADR should act as the first choice redress avenue in a regulatory 
enforcement architecture that assigns roles for both private and public actors. The successful 
inducement of collective ADR necessitates a responsive strategy that takes into account the 
intricacies of behavioural research and the multi-layered incentives that need to be provided 
for the infringers and their victims. The public enforcer should be assigned the role of 
inducing voluntary compensation efforts through fine reductions, which necessitates some 
level of fusion between public and private enforcement. The key concern with collective ADR 
was deemed to be the existence of genuine consent to the proceedings and its binding 
outcome, particularly in case a large amount of non-participating parties would be involved. 
The use of an opt-out model was found to be most desirable for ensuring the broadest possible 
coverage of victims and for increasing the attractiveness of a once-and-for-all global solution 
for the infringing undertakings. The increasing acceptance of opt-out models in European 
civil justice systems is illustrated by the architectures of both the UK and the Netherlands. 
The due process and fairness concerns should be scrutinized in an ex post fairness review that 
gives due consideration to the tradeoffs between individual and collective interests that made 
a consensual outcome possible in the first place. The extent to which collective ADR is 
‘regulated’ would have a direct impact on its functioning. The fairness review could be 
conducted by courts, as seen with the settlement regimes in the Netherlands and the UK, or by 
the public enforcer with possible assistance from neutral third parties, as seen with the 
voluntary redress schemes in the UK.  
 
Furthermore, it is submitted that introducing collective ADR would not be in conflict with 
existing legislation - to the contrary, it would build upon the private enforcement provisions 
that have already been introduced. The Damages Directive defined ‘consensual dispute 
resolution’ as ‘any mechanism enabling parties to reach the out-of-court resolution of a 
dispute concerning a claim for damages’,286 which would cover all forms of collective ADR 
envisioned in this thesis. The Directive explicitly encouraged and promoted consensual 
dispute resolution processes that would cover ‘as many injured parties and infringers as 
                                                            
286 Damages Directive (n 2), Art. 2 (21). 
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legally possible’, 287  which indicates a preference for collective forms of ADR with the 
broadest possible application. The Directive also explicitly encouraged the involvement of 
public enforcers and allowed them to take compensation into account as a mitigating 
circumstance. 288  In addition, the Directive introduced specific procedural provisions that 
would also apply to any future models of collective ADR, namely the suspension of the 
limitation period and ongoing litigation proceedings for the duration of the consensual dispute 
resolution process, and the clarification of the ‘joint and several liability’ relationship between 
settling and non-settling infringers.289 In light of these existing provisions, the Damages 
Directive could serve as a suitable forum for introducing additional collective ADR 
provisions, such as the benchmarks of the fairness review. However, for reasons of 
consistency, it would be advisable to compile all collective redress provisions in a single 
instrument. Should a European collective litigation device apply horizontally across different 
sectors, then it would be advisable to include collective ADR provisions in the same 
instrument. A fuller assessment of such policy choices would go beyond the scope of this 
thesis, however, it is submitted that the lack of a competition-specific legislative instrument 
would not hinder the functioning of collective ADR in the regulatory enforcement architecture 
envisioned. 
 
The following section will take stock of the changes that would have to be made to the current 
architecture in order to successfully integrate collective ADR. To begin with, the development 
of the regulatory enforcement architecture envisioned in this thesis would be illustrative of 
specific policy positions: 
 
● The facilitation of atypical private enforcement structures in order to ensure 
compensation and close the enforcement gap for victims suffering from large-scale 
low-value damage. 
● The exploration of behaviourally-informed and compliance-oriented enforcement 
strategies that promote voluntary compensation as the first choice private enforcement 
avenue. 
                                                            
287 Damages Directive (n 2), Recital 48. 
288 Damages Directive (n 2), Art. 18 (3). 
289 Damages Directive (n 2), Art. 18 & 19. 
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● The recognition of ‘resolution’ as a desirable goal of enforcement and ensuring that 
collective ADR achieves that goal by leading to just and efficient compensatory 
outcomes for all affected parties. 
● The promotion of coordination and cooperation between public and private 
enforcement in order to induce collective ADR. 
● The acceptance of possible tradeoffs that occur in collective and consensual processes 
that include a large number of non-participating parties. 
 
Meeting the objectives above could require the following modifications: 
 
● An amendment to the fining policy of competition infringements, which recognizes 
compensation as a mitigating circumstance and provides specific guidelines on the 
steps that would have to be taken in order to receive a fine reduction. 
● The introduction of a collective redress device that introduces collective litigation and 
collective ADR. The device should permit opt-out applications, particularly when 
victims suffered from large-scale low-value damage. 
● The introduction of a reasonable fairness review to be applied by public enforcers and 
courts for collective ADR outcomes, particularly for those involving a large number of 
non-participating parties. 
● An amendment to the European private international law regime that clarifies and 
ensures the effective cross-border recognition and enforcement of collective ADR 
outcomes. 
 
To conclude, collective ADR is capable of achieving the effective, efficient and fair private 
enforcement of competition law and should be explored further as a policy option on the 
European level. Ultimately, this thesis laid out the basic groundwork that could be used to 
develop a more detailed assessment of the multifaceted implications of integrating collective 
ADR into existing frameworks. 
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